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4executive summary
The problem of post-election violence seems to be ever-more present as complexities of nation-building 
and democratic development arise.  This report deals with some relevant questions.  It is based on the 
outcome of discussions at a December 2008 workshop organized in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by the Programme 
in Comparative Media Law and Policy at the University of Oxford, the Center for Global Communications 
Studies at the Annenberg School, University of Pennsylvania and the Stanhope Centre for Communications 
Policy Research.1  Our objective was to examine the role of the media in the aftermath of competitive 
elections.  
The workshop provided the opportunity to explore the election experiences of Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, 
Somaliland, Tanzania and Sudan in a comparative framework.  The focus was on understanding why 
election violence occurred after some elections, what the role of the media was in either exacerbating or 
resolving disputes, and what this suggests about the broader political project and the state of the media 
in the countries under examination. 
This report is only an introduction to the subject.  Additional structured research will be important in 
furthering our understanding of these important issues, but we hope that this provides a starting point 
from which to launch deeper studies.  As a way of furthering research in this area, this report suggests three 
ways of analyzing the role of the media can play in post-election violence: 1) as an amplifier, facilitating 
and accelerating the spread of messages that both encourage violence or appeal for peaceful resolutions; 
2) as a mirror, offering either an accurate or somewhat distorted reflection of the state and nation-building 
process; and 3) as an enabler, contributing to the process of nation-building.  We conclude by offering 
media policy recommendations. 
1  The workshop, held in Addis Ababa on December 15 and 16, 2008, was sponsored by the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool Fund and 
British Embassy in Addis Ababa.
5part 1: exploring the issue
Post-election violence has become an increasingly 
observable phenomenon.  The existence and 
destructive force of post-election violence 
challenges political transitions, aspects of nation-
building, and notions of democratization itself. 
Post-election violence has a global footprint and 
a global impact, and as such, it is necessary to 
develop an understanding of how and when such 
violence occurs (or can be prevented) in a variety of 
circumstances.  
The subject is a massive one.  Our task here is to 
begin the inquiry by focusing on a workshop held 
in Ethiopia in December 2008.  The workshop was 
organized to explore issues associated with the 
media and post-election violence in East Africa, 
though the lessons learned can be applied to 
other contexts.  It was undertaken with the goal of 
developing useful policy recommendations as well 
as a theoretical framework that could drive a future 
research agenda.  This is elaborated in Part 3 of the 
report.
Post-Election Violence in Context
As elections in Africa have become more competitive, 
they, and their aftermath, have also become more 
violent.  Elections are intended to facilitate political 
conflict in a controlled, non-violent way and to 
legitimate outcomes—whether democratically 
determined or not.  But given that most African 
states have weak institutions, that the rule of law is 
often diluted, that orderly succession is difficult to 
achieve and that many states are either engaged in 
or emerging from war, this process is easily inflamed. 
Election-related violence is typically systemic and is 
often an indicator of challenges faced in terms of 
economic development, nation-building and the 
consolidation of political power. 
This has certainly been the case in Kenya, where 
violence of varying degrees has flared up consistently 
in elections since 1992, most recently after the 2007 
Presidential election where the outcome was deeply 
contested led to violent protests.  Although Kenya is 
frequently cited as a model for political stability and 
economic development in Africa, as Anderson and 
Lochery remind us, the violence in the aftermath of 
the Kenyan 2007 poll must be seen in the context of 
the contested nature of land settlement schemes 
since the 1960s and subsequent political violence. 
Violence is a process, not an event. Violent acts 
may be spontaneous, but they are more often the 
product of a longer sequence of historical decisions 
and political actions.2
Among the many factors that can affect the 
incidence of violence, the role of the media is surely 
one of them.  Many accounts of election-related 
disputes in East Africa and elsewhere express a 
concern about the role of media.  Although it is not 
usually the defining factor in determining whether 
violence will or will not occur, the role of the media 
is a significant aspect of the overall context. 
Violence can be associated with all three or just 
one of the election phases: the pre-election phase, 
the day/s of the election, or the immediate post-
election period.  Typically, violence is clustered 
around the pre- and post-election period; voting 
day generally—but not always—appears to proceed 
peacefully.  It is the campaigning period and when 
the results start to emerge that the likelihood of 
violence increases. 
The level of competition in an election is a 
fundamental test for the likelihood of violence.3 
Kenya is representative of a growing trend 
across Africa whereby multiparty elections are 
associated with violence.  In addition, the most 
recent elections in both Ethiopia (2005) and 
Zimbabwe (2008) saw scores killed.  The elections 
in Kenya, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe were intensely 
competitive, and the upcoming elections in 
Somaliland—originally scheduled for September 
2009, but now postponed—and Sudan in 2010, are 
expected to be similarly intense.  This constitutes 
a marked difference with the landslide elections 
historically witnessed in the region, which are still 
seen in places such as Rwanda.4  Landslide elections 
2  Anderson and Lochery, “Violence and Exodus in Kenya’s Rift 
Valley, 2008,” 328.
3  In some cases, the fear of violence significantly shapes voting 
behaviour in essence making elections less competitive than they 
might otherwise be. In Ghana’s 1996 elections, for example, 
Anthony Kwesi Aubynn’s research indicates that “inter-elite rivalry 
galvanised into expectations of post-elections violence and created 
fear among the electorate.  This tense pre-election environment 
appears to have been strategically orchestrated by the politicians 
and at the end of it all, played a very important role in voters’ 
decisions as to which party to vote for during the 1996 election. 
Apparently, many voters voted for J.J. Rawlings, and the NDC, not 
necessarily because of passionate loyal attachment to them or 
any fervid approval of their economic policy but because… they 
feared violence if Rawlings and the NDC lost the election. (Aubynn, 
“Behind the Transparent Ballot Box,” 103).
4   President Paul Kagame claimed 95 percent of the vote in 
presidential elections held in 2003 and all parties which competed 
in the subsequent parliamentary elections had supported his 
candidacy. See Reyntjens, “Post-1994 politics in Rwanda.”
6may also precipitate violence, but the response 
is more typically a long-term insurgency.  Finally, 
competitive elections also differ from elections 
with marked voter apathy, such as Sudan’s election 
in 1996 and Ethiopia’s regional elections in 2008 
and, we anticipate, Ethiopia’s general election in 
2010.  In such cases, the likelihood of violence is 
relatively low.
Pre-election violence can  have an impact in 
shaping the election.  In Ethiopia, for example, 
the ruling EPRDF has a history of harassing and 
violently targeting opposition groups.  In the first 
multi-party elections the country held in 1992, the 
opposition Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) pulled out 
and retreated back to its guerrilla struggle.  More 
recently, in preparation for the upcoming 2010 
elections, the Unity for Democracy and Justice 
(UDJ) party has said it is considering a boycott due 
to intimidation and violence, including the arrest 
of its leader, Birtukan Mideska.  In some cases, 
this violence has a lingering effect defining and 
setting the tone for the entire election period; at 
the very least it certainly does not bode well for the 
election. 
Our specific interest in this report is on the post-
election period, which has often been neglected by 
scholars and policymakers.  Typically, more focus is 
given to the role of the media, and media monitoring, 
in the run-up to, and during, voting day(s).  Laws are 
often made and the media is monitored specifically 
for this earlier period.  Similarly, election observers 
typically arrive several months before voting day 
to determine levels of press harassment, media 
manipulation and the levelness of the ‘playing field.’ 
The presence of such observers helps ameliorate 
pre-election issues.  But, barring any immediate 
problems, election observers typically end their 
mission with an assessment soon after the official 
results are announced. 
Violence in the post-election phase is often 
expressed, of course, over outcome and/or process. 
Citizens take to the streets to protest, and there 
may be riots or targeted attacks on certain groups. 
Violence usually reflects deeper grievances—not 
just the outcome itself—and elements of power, 
including officials and politicians, are frequently a 
party to or an instigator of the violence.  In some 
cases the violence can force significant changes 
within a nation or bring it near or even over the 
precipice of war or government dissolve.
One way of understanding post-election violence 
and the possible media-related imperatives is to 
look at the variety of contexts in which it can occur. 
We consider the following to be important: 
Post-election violence where there is 1. 
persistent and sustained sense of election 
fraud.
Post-election violence where the outcome 2. 
is not so contested, but there is a bitter and 
non-accepting loser.  A subset of this is when 
the government loses (and is surprised and 
shocked by the result).
Post-election violence where the cause 3. 
of violence is an external or domestic 
source not immediately participating in the 
election process (another state, “terrorists,” 
economic “profiteers” of violence).
Post-election violence where the violence 4. 
is connected to contested legitimacy of the 
state itself or the failure/weakness of the 
nation-building process  
Post-election violence that is supported or 5. 
provoked by the government to implement 
controversial restrictions, consolidate 
political power or weaken certain 
communities.
Post-election violence that is pursued by 6. 
non-state actors (including opposition 
parties) to economically profit from conflict, 
consolidate political power or weaken 
certain communities.
There are certainly additional possible contexts 
for post-election violence, but for the purposes 
of this report, namely the study of the media and 
its contribution to political/economic divides and 
instability, we will focus on the above points.
Looking at these questions in the context of East 
Africa, there is an additional complicating factor: 
the challenge of holding elections in states emerging 
from war.  The literature on elections in conflict 
zones does not systematically address the role 
of the media, even as it raises relevant questions 
about political competition and violence and the 
applicability of imposing democratic templates on 
states.5
5  See Hoglund, “Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden 
Societies;” Fisher, “Electoral Conflict and Violence;” Reilly, 
Democracy in Divided Societies; Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler, 
eds., Votes, Money and Violence; Rapoport and Weinberg, eds., 
The Democratic Experience and Political Violence; Wilkenson, 
Votes and Violence.
7In the recent and accessible book, Wars, Guns 
and Votes, Oxford academic Paul Collier asks a 
foreground question: do elections increase the 
likelihood of violence and if so, why and what 
should be done about it?  The question of whether 
elections are held “too soon” or are for some other 
reason counterproductive in terms of transitions is 
beyond the scope of this report.  But Collier’s book 
is important because it makes an argument that is 
central for our study:
A post-conflict election shifts the risk 
of conflict reversion. In the year before 
the election the risk of going back to 
violence is very sharply reduced: the 
society looks to have reached safety.  
But in the year after the election the 
risk explodes upward.  The net effect 
of the election is to make the society 
more dangerous.6 
Collier is not alone in reminding us that the process of 
elections, during which differences are emphasized 
as a way of gaining political support, can exacerbate 
polarization, conflict and societal cleavages.7 
Since the early 1990s, when international efforts 
to encourage democratization in a post-Cold War 
era proliferated, some scholars have been arguing 
that there are fundamental faults in the prevailing 
democratization and development paradigm. 
Roland Paris, for example, has extensively argued 
how what he calls “liberal internationalism,” or the 
“transplanting Western models of social, political 
and economic organization into war-shattered 
states in order to control civil conflict,” has not been 
particularly effective at establishing stable peace. 
And academics such as James Putzel and Thomas 
Carothers have similarly argued that there are 
problems with the transitioning paradigm for fragile 
states where state-building—including establishing 
territorial control, security and the monopoly of 
the means of violence, and establishing the fiscal 
basis of public authority—is the priority. State 
collapse is a real concern and undermining these 
factors in essence undermines further democratic 
development as well.8
In terms of international norms for media regulation, 
concern about state collapse should inform media 
policy; however, enforcing freedom of expression 
6  Collier, Wars, Guns and Violence, 81.
7  Hoglund, “Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies;” 
Paris, At War’s End; Aubynn, “Behind the Transparent Ballot Box;” 
Olukoshi, “A Transition to Nowhere.” 
8  Putzel, “The Politics of ‘Participation;” Carothers, “The End 
of the Transition Paradigm.”
norms often prevails over concerns of state collapse. 
Governments, however, also manipulate popular 
fears of the media’s ability to incite genocide as a 
rationale for closing down media outlets.  Given the 
experience of Rwanda, this has particularly been 
the case in Eastern Africa. 
In the case of Ethiopia, for example, one justification 
for closing down SMS (as well as many of the more 
critical newspapers) during the period of violence 
immediately after the elections was purported 
concern that inflammatory speech would enflame 
tensions and encourage violence, as occurred with 
hate radio in Rwanda.  
However, drawing parallels with Rwanda is often 
deeply problematic.  It not only mischaracterizes 
the use of the media there but in other countries 
as well.  It also obscures the reality of the political 
events that may be unfolding.   In many cases, 
including Rwanda, hate speech emanates directly 
from the government or politicians—it is not the 
responsibility of the media alone.  Indeed, in Ethiopia 
some opposition supporters were wary about what 
they perceived to be deliberate manipulation of 
ethnic issues on the part of some within the ruling 
party. 
The Ethiopian Ministry of Information was sharply 
criticized by some for not effectively gauging the 
effects that government propaganda would have 
on the public during sensitive times such as the 
post-election period. In his “Comments on the 
Aftermath of the Ethiopian Crisis,” the academic 
Christopher Clapham argued that some of the 
EPRDF’s comments exacerbated the situation by 
suggesting the situation was potentially:
equivalent to the Rwanda genocide,9 
[which] conveyed a very clear 
impression, both to the opposition 
and to the outside world, that the 
EPRDF is entirely unwilling to engage 
in any normal or reasonable political 
process.10 
As Clapham emphasizes, government propaganda 
and ineffective dialogue can have a key, even if 
unintentional, role in encouraging polarization, 
exacerbating tensions and escalating the violence 
during the election period. 
9  Bereket is quoted as saying “The alternative was strife 
between the different nationalities of Ethiopia which might have 
made the Rwandan genocide look like child’s play” (Plaut, “High 
Stakes in Ethiopia Standoff”). 
10  Clapham, “Comments on the Political Crisis in Ethiopia.”
8While governments often do manipulate reasoning 
for regulating the media for political ends, the 
concern about the media’s role in exacerbating 
violence is very real, particularly when it comes to 
introducing new technologies.
In all of these cases, it is helpful to remember that the 
use of the media to spread violence and encourage 
a particular ideology is not new.  In Kenya, for 
example, politics has been polarized for decades, 
and various actors in the political arena have stoked 
this polarization to their benefit, including through 
various communication mechanisms.  Referring to 
the inflammatory speech from the vernacular radios 
during the post-election period, one journalist 
noted:
Before the radios, elders and church 
platforms were used.  They would 
use coded messages.  You have to 
understand the language. [Suspicion] 
takes time to build… but they were 
building suspicion, making them feel 
threatened. It is halfway through 
creating an army.11
Media regulation has failed to keep up with the rapid 
liberalization of the airwaves or the emergence of 
new technology such as SMS messaging.  There 
has, for example, been too little discussion on what 
constitutes hate speech on SMS or how governments 
should address the challenge when it occurs.  At the 
same time, a nuanced media policy that is rooted 
in political realities would recognize that it might 
not be possible to develop media policies that can 
effectively keep up with a continuously changing 
media environment.  As such, it may be necessary 
to ask what is the next best solution or what is most 
appropriate at the moment, and to be willing to re-
evaluate policy decisions in the future.   
Towards a Structure of Analysis
In the third part of this report, we seek to draw out 
an analytical framework that takes these issues into 
account.  Here we offer a brief preview of the issues 
we found most compelling in thinking about the 
approach that local policymakers and actors, as well 
as international supporters, can take to understand 
the complex and often overlooked issue of media 
and post-election violence as well as the media’s 
potential contributions to reconciliation, nation-
building and societal functioning. 
11  Interview: Samuel Muhuny, director of Necofa Kenya
In the post-election context, the media (and 
particularly new media) can play three roles: that of 
mirror, amplifier and enabler.
As a mirror, the press, in particular, serves as 
an important reflection of the state and nation-
building process. It provides insight into political 
dynamics and the level of dialogue within a society. 
It suggests the level of polarization in a society, 
the progress of reconciliation and, in the case of 
post-election violence, the possible avenues for 
the peaceful resolution of disputes. To deepen our 
understanding of how the media can be used as a 
mirror to provide insight into political conflicts, we 
have identified four key areas for analysis: historic 
pathways, media structure, electoral system design 
and political structure. 
In much the same way as the press acts as a mirror, 
the new technologies employed for the distribution 
of media serve as an amplifier.  Election-related 
violence is not a new phenomenon, but the use of 
mobile phones, the proliferation of radio stations, 
and an increasing ability to connect with like-minded 
individuals through Facebook and other social 
networking platforms facilitates and accelerates 
the spread of messages in a less controllable way. 
In short, technology does not necessarily alter the 
message—rumours and stereotypes that have been 
propagated for decades are still central in much of 
the violence— but it speeds up the ways in which 
such messages penetrate communities and mobilize 
individuals and groups for action.  Throughout this 
report, we will return to questions of what ‘media’ 
exactly we are referring to.  It is our argument that 
media such as mosques or tea houses can have as 
much influence in shaping politics and encouraging 
(or preventing) post-election violence as television 
or newspapers.  These are, obviously, widely 
different mediums and it is difficult to interrogate 
all of them in the space of this report. Therefore, 
our focus is on those outlets typically included in 
media regulation, such as the print media, as well 
as some new technologies such as SMS, given their 
growing influence and complex role.
In the Kenyan elections of 2007 we saw some of the 
effects new technology can have on post-election 
violence.  Despite a history of violence associated 
with elections, these were the first elections 
where mobile phones and access to vernacular 
radio stations was widely available.  While mobile 
phones can be used for election monitoring and 
the verification of results, including obtaining up-
to-date provisional results, in the case of Kenya, 
many of these benefits were overshadowed by the 
9role of mobile technology in spreading hate speech, 
particularly after polls closed.  UN reports noted 
that SMS was vigorously employed in campaigns to 
“spread the word of hate.”12  During Ethiopia’s 2005 
elections, the government was highly sensitive to 
the use of text messaging in organizing protests in 
support of the opposition, and the SMS service was 
shut down for a year and a half. 
The often unpredictable nature of new technology 
affects how we think about media policy and 
regulation in post-war situations.  As discussed in the 
previous section, there are very real concerns about 
elections making violent conflict more likely; the 
same is true for media liberalization.  In Somaliland, 
for example, our research has shown that a 
significant portion of the population does not think 
private radio stations should be introduced at this 
point. After years of war and continued outbreaks 
of violence, some Somalilanders argue that it is 
beyond the capacity of the current government to 
ensure that private radio stations do not exacerbate 
clan tensions.  We want to be careful to note that we 
do not see this as an issue of censorship or media 
freedom but rather one of sequencing, institution-
building and enhancing capacity.
The media’s role as an enabler is the most 
misunderstood and overlooked factor but arguably 
the most important.  While much of the discourse 
around the media in fragile states focuses on 
promoting freedom of expression, we believe that 
the role of the media in nation-building should 
be prioritized.  Recognizing that that the concept 
of ‘nation-building’ is contestable, by media as 
an enabler we suggest the ways in which the 
media might perform a positive role in transitional 
justice processes; in creating a national identity; in 
mediating divergent perspectives and negotiating 
political power, particularly among elites, on a 
national vision; and in providing  a space for dialogue 
to reduce polarization.
Together, the three roles of the media offer a way 
of thinking about how the media contributes to 
the stability or instability of post-election periods. 
The political disputes, and associated violence, 
we discuss in this report are not uniform.  Each 
case has its own underlying causes which are an 
12  For example, the following message was circulated: “We 
say no more innocent Kikuyu blood will be shed. We will slaughter 
them right here in the capital city. For justice, compile a list of all 
Luos and Kaleos [two tribes associated with ODM] you know at 
work, your estate, anywhere in Nairobi, plus where and how their 
children go to school. We will give you a number to text this info.” 
(IRIN, “Kenya: Spreading the Word of Hate.”)
assemblage of political, economic, historical and 
cultural factors.  These cases also demonstrate the 
wide array of considerations that must be taken 
into account—from division in society on the one 
hand or reconciliation, nation-building and societal 
functioning on the other.  We cannot propose to 
offer policy templates applicable for all situations 
but we do hope to distill a process of analysis and 
some more general reflections on media policy 
that stakeholders should consider when facing 
potentially disputed elections. 
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part 2: workshop summary
The second part of this report draws out some of 
the highlights from the workshop and summarizes 
the main arguments that were made.  Each session 
description includes a box where we, as authors, 
offer our comments on what we considered to be 
the most important issues that were discussed.
The workshop considered case studies in East 
Africa where there was the tradition or possibility 
of competitive elections.  We chose these criteria 
because the role of media may be functionally 
different in terms of its pre-election responsibilities 
and its post-election effects on violence where 
there is either a) an obvious landslide or b) marked 
voter apathy.  There are important roles for the 
media to play even in these two instances, including 
serving as a check against corruption, ensuring that 
voters are informed, and determining the integrity 
of the election process.  However, it is where there 
is meaningful competition that the potential for 
violence increases and the functions of the media 
become more complex.  It is in these instances where 
it is especially important to define the responsibility 
of the media and to craft appropriate media policy 
and regulation. With this as a criterion, the case 
studies discussed in the workshop and in this 
report include Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, 
Somaliland and Sudan. 
All of these countries, except for Sudan, have had at 
least one relatively competitive election in the past 
ten years, although their upcoming elections appear 
likely to be competitive and potentially contentious. 
Ethiopia’s fiercely contested 2005 election will be 
discussed extensively; Uganda’s 2006 elections 
were somewhat competitive; Kenya’s 2007 election 
and the current power-sharing government is the 
result of highly contentious elections; in Tanzania, 
the condition of competitiveness was most obvious 
in the 1990s; and Somaliland held elections in 2003 
where the president won by 80 votes. 
Ethiopia and Kenya both recently experienced 
post-election violence, while Uganda and Tanzania 
have had only minimal election-related violence. 
Somaliland and Sudan are holding crucial elections 
in 2010 that look to be highly contentious.  For a 
more in-depth review of the specific case studies, 
see Appendix A. 
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Session 1: Introduction
Nicole Stremlau, Monroe Price and Paolo Mancini
The workshop opened by questioning what 
framework can help in understanding the media in 
post-election violence and its potential for aiding 
dispute resolution.  The organizers emphasized that 
the workshop does not begin with the premise that 
the media causes election violence. It is only one 
actor among many.  The challenge for the workshop 
was to better understand the nuanced and changing 
role the media plays, particularly given how new 
technology is accelerating and expanding the 
reach of messages, while not necessarily changing 
them.  In this context, what ‘the media’ referred to 
exactly was discussed.  Outlets such as radio and 
newspapers are certainly included.  And the internet 
and mobile phones are also generally considered to 
be part of a broader media ecology. But typically, 
less attention is given to news outlets such as 
mosques or teashops or mediums such as poetry. 
It was argued that in many societies, if the goal is 
to understand how news and information shapes 
political processes, these forms of communication 
are neglected at peril. 
Different factors—electoral, political, media and 
historical—were outlined in an effort to encourage 
participants to consider all possible issues affecting 
the media and post-election period.  Thinking 
comparatively about the case studies also helps to 
draw out which factors are most salient.  
Paolo Mancini discussed the application of 
comparative methodology to media systems in 
Africa. His 2004 publication, Comparing Media 
Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics, co-
authored with Daniel Hallin, proposed a typology 
for the categorization of media systems in 24 
European and North American countries. Three 
media system models were identified: a Liberal 
Model, a Democratic Corporatist Model and a 
Polarized Pluralist Model. 
Although Mancini advocated comparative research 
regarding media systems, he cautioned against the 
uncritical application of his model to new contexts. 
Whilst it can be useful to consider the key variables 
identified in the European and North American 
cases, the models cannot necessarily be applied 
without adaptation. Additional variables are likely 
to be required to understand the East African 
context, including the crucial influence of diaspora 
on the media. 
The most similar approach to case selection for 
comparative research was emphasized and it was 
agreed that a comparison between East African 
countries is fruitful.
Four factors were identified which are likely to 
affect a state’s media and its role in mitigating or 
promoting conflict:
The level of legitimacy ascribed to the state 1. 
and the degree of trust and confidence citizens 
have in state institutions. Where the state’s 
rational-legal authority and citizen acceptance 
of the state are lower, the media tend to be 
instrumentalized and used for the attainment 
of particularistic goods rather than for public 
information. 
Political polarization, entailed by extremes 2. 
of political opinion and the existence of anti-
system elements which may not accept the 
electoral system, is conducive to conflict.
High levels of media partisanship reduce the 3. 
likelihood that media will act as a moderating 
peaceful influence when there is a threat of 
violent conflict. Partisanship is not inevitably 
problematic, but becomes so in the context of a 
lack of transparency. 
Where media are highly commercialized there 4. 
are incentives for sensational reporting of the 
news and media is unlikely to contribute to 
conflict-prevention or mitigation. 
The ‘ritual’ aspect of elections and their potential 
to generate unity at the national or sub-national 
level was emphasized. Where state legitimacy is 
high, elections can contribute to nation-building; 
when there is a high level of polarization, elections 
reinforce group partisanship and may exacerbate 
conflicts leading to more violence.
The session concluded with an assertion of 
the importance of journalistic professionalism, 
whereby journalists are aware of their power and 
the particular threats which exist in their country in 
relation to the likely occurrence of violent conflict. 
Whilst acknowledging that ‘professionalization’ 
could be ascribed a variety of different meanings, 
particular importance was placed upon a degree of 
technical knowledge and education.
During the discussion a debate was raised over the 
value and possibility of importing Western models 
of media systems. Mancini suggested that he was 
not suggesting that any of the models in his book 
12
should be imported.  The major point was seeking 
to understand variables and how they contributed 
to the functioning of media in society. 
One participant argued that in Kenya, the conflict 
has been all-pervasive and can be seen during the 
elections in 1992, 2002 and 2007.  It is difficult to 
know where to draw the line on when violence starts 
because ‘post-election violence’ assumes that the 
violence starts only after the election; the reality, 
according to this participant, is the announcement 
of the election itself is the beginning of violence. 
S/he claimed that too often Western democracies 
make assumptions that the politics in many African 
countries is similarly a ‘gentleman’s game’ where 
after one loses there is discord, and argued that this 
is not the case.  
While a colleague agreed with the argument that 
pushing for a Western model in all situations 
is problematic, he noted that he was afraid to 
emphasize the point because it would give a 
pretext to authoritarian states to use this game 
to stay in power. This challenge was compared to 
the difficulties in navigating theories of cultural 
relativism and  norms of human rights. 
KEY FINDINGS
The importance of legitimate institutions in 
regulating the media, managing elections and 
resolving disputes is central to the issue of 
media and post-election violence
Rather than focusing on normative discussions 
about the media, the transparency of political 
parallelism of media should be emphasized
There is no model for either analyzing media 
systems in election violence or an ideal system 
for media in fragile states.  The historical and 
political context must be central to any study of 
the media’s role or analysis
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Session 2: Case Study Experiences from the 
Region
Devra Moehler (chair), Edwin Nyutho, Bernard 
Tabaire, Charles Kayoka, Berouk Mesfin and 
Mohamed Fadal
The session was devoted to comparative analysis of 
recent elections in the region within their particular 
historical, political and social contexts. Discussion 
focused on the nature of violence, where it occurred, 
and the role of the media before, during and after 
elections.  The Kenyan, Ugandan, Tanzanian and 
Ethiopian cases were presented in detail, and brief 
introductions to the situation in Somaliland and 
Sudan were offered.
Although the countries under discussion had very 
different experiences of elections and highly varied 
media landscapes, key themes emerged across the 
case studies which echoed the variables proposed 
in the introductory session.  In particular, the 
pattern of state or nation-building, the consequent 
importance of ‘ethnicity,’ and the credibility of 
institutions charged with conducting elections were 
cited as relevant to determining levels of conflict 
witnessed during the electoral period.
In terms of political factors, the relative importance 
of ethnicity within the polity, and the comparative 
degree to which governments have been able 
to overcome societal divisions in order to affect 
nation–building, were discussed.  Also central to 
the discussion were the role of political elites—
including distrust of them by the population, 
corruption, ownership of the media and their role 
in fomenting violence.
In Kenya, which experienced large-scale violence 
during and after the 2007 election period, it was 
argued that there has been a failure to develop a 
national identity while ethnic communities have 
formed a multitude of nation states within imposed 
colonial boundaries. The government has not been 
able to bring groups together into a national entity 
and ethnic mobilization provided a means to attain 
political power. In contrast, in the Tanzanian case, 
the election period was not entirely free of violence, 
but conflict was highly localized. The comparatively 
low importance of ethnicity in the Tanzanian polity 
and a history of inclusive politics were important in 
preventing violent conflict.
The history of elections within states was discussed. 
Kenya’s 2007 elections were located on a continuum 
with the elections of 1992, which were also marred 
by violence and mass displacement. The importance 
of analysing Ethiopia’s 2005 election and its violent 
aftermath in the context of previous polls (which 
were largely uncompetitive) and through the prism 
of the ruling party’s political ideology was also 
emphasized. 
Other electoral variables which emerged included 
the effectiveness and credibility of institutions 
mandated to conduct elections.  In the Ugandan 
case, one reason given for the lower level of 
violence in 2006 in comparison to 2001 was the 
improved management of elections, including 
more responsible behaviour on the part of security 
forces and consultation with various parties by 
the Electoral Commission on matters including 
complaints mechanisms. The courts are also 
generally thought to be fair in arbitrating disputes 
over elections and thus losers have tended to accept 
their verdicts rather than organizing supporters 
to obtain redress through violence. The Electoral 
Commission observed the constitutional stipulation 
that the successful presidential candidate must 
be announced within 48 hours of the closure of 
the polls. In contrast, the speaker illustrating the 
Ethiopian case saw delays in announcement of 
the results as having increased the likelihood of 
violence.
The key media-related factors discussed were 
journalistic professionalism, the existence of 
effective regulatory systems and the political 
polarization of the media. The media’s interaction 
with factors such as power and ethnicity was also 
emphasized.
The way in which governments attempted to or 
failed to control the media was implicated in some 
cases.  In Kenya, the proliferation of media outlets 
since the re-introduction of multi-party politics, 
from one national broadcaster in 1991 to more than 
371 FM radio stations and 92 licensed TV stations 
in 2008, has not been met with a new regulatory 
framework. Government attempts to control the 
situation through banning live broadcasts were 
misjudged and forced people to turn to unreliable 
sources of information.  
There were also problems with the regulatory 
structure in Uganda.  The Media Council and 
Broadcasting Council which are statutory bodies lack 
capacity and their roles have often been usurped by 
other state agents.  In Uganda, there is an active 
media, but its coverage of elections is affected by 
the wider political context in which it must operate. 
Laws regarding criminal defamation, sedition and 
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the promotion of sectarianism are often evoked 
by the government.  The Monitor newspaper itself 
tallied votes cast on polling day and broadcast the 
results obtained on its radio outlet, KFM; however, 
the radio signal was blocked by the government. 
In several of the countries, bills regulating the 
media are under consideration or have recently 
been introduced, including a controversial new 
Media Bill in Kenya. 
Self-regulation by the media was discussed.  In 
Uganda, The Monitor newspaper formulated its 
own benchmarks for electoral coverage in 2006, 
inviting parties to complain if they felt their 
candidates were not being allocated fair coverage. 
Civil society was active in this field in both 
Uganda and Tanzania.  In Uganda the Democracy 
Monitoring Group included media coverage in its 
remit during the 2006 elections.  The Tanzanian 
chapter of Gender and Media in Southern Africa 
(GEMSAT) has monitored election coverage and 
produces a weekly publication entitled Election 
Monitors during campaign periods.  They assessed 
adherence to ethical standards, the gender balance 
of coverage and provision of informative content 
and civic education.  This enabled public challenges 
to be made to bad performers. 
Journalistic professionalism was frequently 
mentioned as a factor exacerbating tensions.  On 
the one hand, some of the problems within the 
media during the post-election period in Kenya 
have been attributed to poor journalism.  But on 
the other hand the approach of the media has been 
attributed to the goals of political elites.  Radio 
presenters were described as being unable to 
moderate discussion and mediate conflict during 
phone-in programmes.  One speaker highlighted 
the poor remuneration of journalists as a factor that 
facilitated corruption and manipulation.  To varying 
levels across the countries this made it difficult for 
newspapers to keep good employees, leading to a 
prevalence of inexperienced journalists covering 
elections. 
The role of media in violence, particularly in terms 
of the role media outlets have played as platforms 
for expression for political parties, governments 
and voters was discussed across the case studies. 
In the Kenyan case radio was heavily implicated in 
contributing to violence.  In particular, phone-in 
radio shows permitted the declaration of extreme 
sentiments.  In contrast, one speaker suggested 
that in Uganda, the opportunity which newspapers 
and radio stations provided for parties and their 
supporters to express their views before, during 
and after election campaigns checked any likelihood 
of violent conflict as aggrieved parties were able 
to express their feelings through words rather 
than violence.  One participant asked whether the 
presentation of a view in the media that elections 
would inevitably be flawed and the expression of the 
expectation of violence was likely to exacerbate the 
likelihood of conflict.  Indeed, this was a challenge 
that arose throughout the workshop—how can a 
realistic assessment be made on the possibility of 
election-related disputes and violence without in 
fact subtly elevating the possibility?  Preparation for 
all eventualities is important but the discussion can 
encourage the idea that the elections are somehow 
flawed.
The impact of state ownership or influence over 
media on election campaigns was raised.  State-
owned media bias was said to be becoming a 
less significant impediment to the conduct of fair 
elections in Uganda in the context of proliferation 
of private outlets, despite the fact that the state 
body, the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC), 
continued to devote significantly more time to 
the incumbent Museveni than other presidential 
candidates.  Overall, the public media was credited 
with receiving little attention from the populace, 
with the New Vision as an important exception to 
some extent due to its relatively balanced reporting 
and popularity.  In Tanzania, the existence of private 
media outlets does not preclude state influence. 
Media remain predominately under the control of 
a small number of men who are often co-opted 
through appointment to government posts or 
may be only owners by proxy as politicians retain 
control.
The impact of unconventional media forms was 
discussed. In the Kenyan case, rumour, often spread 
using mobile phones, was said to have been very 
powerful, and the use of the internet and blogs to 
spread information fuelled violence.  In the case of 
Ethiopia, websites run by Ethiopian diaspora groups 
played a central role during the elections.  
One participant asked how much emphasis should 
be placed on pictures and images used, as these 
could play a huge role in generating uncertainty 
and tension.  Media monitoring tends to focus on 
content analysis of text, but pictures are particularly 
important where literacy levels are low.
Language was noted to be often overlooked but 
having a crucial reflective and constitutive role in 
relation to ethnicity in a country.  This also connects 
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with issues of nation-building.  The relationship 
between the level of ethnic polarization in the state 
and the media was discussed in relation to the 
existence of a broadcaster in a ‘national’ language. 
In Kenya, where hundreds of broadcasters were 
working in more than 20 languages, a well-
respected national broadcaster working in Kiswahili 
could have had a significant preventative impact. 
Taking Tanzania as an example, the different roles 
of Swahili versus English media was flagged as an 
important issue for further research.  Many people 
in rural Tanzania do not speak English, but is the 
issue that most Tanzanians communicate in Swahili 
a homogenizing effect? How is this different from 
the fact that Somalis enjoy a shared language yet 
have struggled with building a nation? 
The case studies called into question a focus on post-
election violence.  In Kenya, violence began prior to 
the announcement of election results; in Uganda, 
although previous elections have been violent, 
violence has been concentrated in the period before 
polling. Participants were reminded that violence 
takes many different forms and understandings of 
violence were questioned, introducing the question 
of structural violence.
Following the country-specific presentations, the 
usefulness of a similar case studies approach was 
discussed, including cross-continental comparisons. 
It was, for example, also proposed that it would 
be possible to compare the Tanzanian case with 
1950s Italy.  Overall, however it was re-emphasized 
that the cases should not be compared with a 
normative liberal model, as doing so only obscures 
the important nuances and characteristics defining 
the political and media systems. 
KEY FINDINGS
Post-election violence should not be seen as an 
isolated event of violence but part of a longer 
process and history of conflict, often with political 
and economic grievances going back for decades
Media monitoring can be an effective tool in both 
gauging the potential of violence associated with 
the elections but it should not just occur in the pre-
election and voting period as is most often the case, 
but in the post-election period as well
Notions of professionalization should be probed 
in each society and normative assumptions of 
journalists being ‘balanced watchdogs’ should be 
avoided.  Understanding the ideology of journalists 
is essential to understanding the media and political 
systems.
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Session 3: Architectures of Electoral Systems 
and their Relationship to Conflict
Paolo Mancini (chair), Carl Dundas, Kimani Njogu, 
John Marsh, Magib Yusuf
The session examined the institutional structures 
in place for the management of elections, including 
the legislative framework, the role of courts, 
electoral management bodies and procedures for 
the announcement of results. 
A presentation on models of electoral systems 
and conflict management provided an overview 
of electoral systems in use across Africa and 
their positive and negative features in relation 
to governmental stability, individual and group 
representation and minimization of racial or ethnic 
conflict.  The importance of selecting an electoral 
system which is adapted to the particular conditions 
prevailing in a state was stressed.
Participants were reminded that the core function 
of an electoral system is to determine the way in 
which the number of votes cast is related to the 
allocation of seats.  But electoral systems also include 
the administrative aspects of electoral processes 
and party formation and alliances.  In some cases, 
there may be specific imperatives dictated by the 
country context.  It may be necessary to assess 
the extent to which electoral systems will facilitate 
the representation of particular elements of the 
population, such as women or ethnic groups.   Some 
African countries, including Lesotho, Mauritius, 
Mozambique and South Africa, have selected 
systems with elements of proportionality which 
should mitigate the potentially adverse effects of 
population diversity and minimize the likelihood of 
ethnic or racial conflict.
Many African states inherited the electoral system 
of their former colonial rulers, meaning that the 
British-inspired first-past-the-post system and its 
two-round variants are common in the region. 
Whilst majoritarian systems such as this do generate 
strong links between constituents and their 
representatives and can produce stable majority 
governments, they inhibit the success of minority 
parties.  In addition, the geographically focused 
voting system incentivizes creation of ethnic or 
regionally-based political units.  It was also noted 
that those deemed losers under majoritarian rules 
are seemingly more likely to draw on undemocratic 
means to advance their interests. 
Under list-based proportional representation 
(PR) systems, citizens vote for parties rather than 
candidates.  Seats are then allocated to parties in 
accordance with the proportion of the total number 
of votes received and filled by candidates in the order 
in which they appear on a party list. Proportional 
systems enable greater success for small or minority 
parties and thus facilitate the representation of 
diverse social groups.  During subsequent discussion 
of the new electoral system in Sudan it was noted 
that a new electoral law adopted in 2008 had altered 
the previous majoritarian system in the interest 
of wider participation.  However, the presence of 
many small parties in the legislature can lead to 
the formation of potentially unstable coalitions 
and could enable the entrance of more extremist 
elements into the political system.  PR does not 
generate strong links between constituents and 
their representatives and dictates a concentration 
of power in the hands of the party leadership.
An additional consideration which was raised in 
relation to the particular features required of East 
African electoral systems was the inclusion of 
diaspora in the electoral process.  In Ethiopia, for 
example, the diaspora plays a strong role in both 
funding and staffing the opposition party. Some 
argue that this has led to polarization of the political 
system.  But given that many countries in the region 
are highly reliant on remittances (in Somaliland, 
remittances provide the most significant source of 
revenue), including or addressing the views of the 
diaspora is a pressing issue.
Formal electoral rules must be situated within the 
particular conditions prevailing in each country, 
which affect the degree to which voters have 
confidence in their institutions, the likelihood 
that rules will be subverted and the capacity of 
institutions to conduct elections successfully. 
The importance of strong institutions was raised 
during the presentation on Kenya, which focused on 
the lack of confidence in the Electoral Commission 
of Kenya.  It was argued that the way in which 
the Kenyan 2007 elections were conducted was 
highly flawed, to the extent that it was impossible 
to determine who had been victorious. Kenyan 
institutions lacked credibility and legitimacy. After 
the elections, aggrieved parties did not address 
their complaints through the court system as the 
courts were not thought likely to be fair arbitrators, 
a legacy lasting for decades from at least the 1960s. 
The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), which is 
responsible for announcing election results, was 
similarly compromised, partly as a result of being 
composed of presidential appointees. 
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It was also emphasized that assessment of the 
conduct of elections cannot be confined to the day 
upon which votes are cast.  Attention was drawn to 
the irregularities in the distribution of voters’ cards 
in Kenya and the consequent underrepresentation 
of women and youth in the electorate.  The voter 
register excluded many eligible voters whilst 
permitting votes to be attributed to deceased 
citizens.  Voter registration is a key issue that can 
lead to disputes and it can be compromised both by 
political interference and incompetence.
A discussion of the role of electoral monitors 
considered ways in which domestic and international 
actors have sought to assess the efficacy and 
fairness of electoral institutions.  Regionally, election 
monitors have been important in determining the 
credibility ascribed to election results although in 
some cases they have also had a role in exacerbating 
disputes.  There may be a number of different 
organizations actively observing the elections 
and there is not necessarily consensus as to how 
transparent the process was.  Such disagreements 
can also fan tensions.  
Symbolically, the invitation of international election 
observers by a government may serve as an 
indication on the part of the ruling authority that 
they will acknowledge recognized standards for 
elections.  And the presence of electoral observers 
enhances the trust of the electorate in the process. 
A participant representing the Carter Center 
emphasised the importance of election observers 
in providing a comparative historical perspective on 
the elections taking place as they are able to assess 
improvement or deterioration since the preceding 
poll. 
Discussion addressed the potential for observer 
findings to be instrumentalized in order to legitimize 
regimes. Although this was a risk, it was argued 
that it did not outweigh the benefits of observer 
presence. 
Extensive debate was had over whether the 
emphasis by election monitors on the pre-election 
period and on voting day was correctly placed.  It 
was argued that focusing on the post-election period 
would be more indicative of the political situation 
and stability of the state.  After all, how disputes 
are resolved is central to post-election violence, 
and is indicative of the quality of institutions and 
the progress of the nation-building project.  Thus, 
the efficacy of monitoring in terms of preventing 
violence should include the safety of the ‘winners’ 
and/or ‘defeated’ and form part of the observers’ 
remit as well as be a focus for media monitors. 
Kenya-specific recommendations were made, 
including the establishment of a special court to 
deal with electoral disputes and the introduction 
of a period between the announcement of results 
and the swearing in of an elected president.  More 
generally, the importance of combining institutional 
strengthening with the provision of voter education 
was stressed. 
KEY FINDINGS
Election monitoring is typically focused on the 
campaigning period and voting day(s).  Election 
monitors should prioritize the post-election 
period and how the parties handle disputes as 
well.  The role of the media should be central to 
this process. 
The systems discussed largely have a 
majoritarian system.   But it was regularly 
argued that a proportional system is better able 
to manage a diverse society then a majoritarian 
one.  Despite concerns that a proportional 
system may be more corrupted, it is likely to 
be better able to manage polarization and 
struggles.   When a majoritarian system does 
prevail, there is evidence (not from the region 
but from elsewhere, including the 2008 elections 
in Ghana) that a two-round system may help to 
alleviate tensions. However, this is very costly 
and burdensome on election management 
bodies.  Many countries are simply not able to 
cope with this system.
Greater attention should be paid to the role of 
the diaspora in elections, including in shaping 
the media environment.  Often they are 
significant supporters and funders of political 
parties.  Diaspora media can have an important 
role in either provoking violence or resolving 
disputes. While often focused on the internet, 
the messages are frequently picked up by other 
local media outlets.
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Session 4: Political Dimensions of Media and 
Electoral Systems
Kimani Njogu (chair), Iginio Gagliardone, Mohamed 
Fadal, James Deane, Amare Aregawi, Tim Allen
This session explored the state-specific historical and 
political factors raised in the introduction in terms 
of their impact upon the legitimacy of institutions 
and government capacity to resolve conflict as well 
as the conduct of elections more generally.  The 
role of the media in nation-building and conflict 
resolution was also discussed. 
The importance of legitimate institutions to prospects 
for conflict resolution was illustrated in contrasting 
examples from Somaliland and Ethiopia.  Drawing 
on the example of Somaliland’s highly competitive 
Presidential elections in 2003, Somaliland’s guurti 
(House of Elders), which forms part of the bicameral 
legislature, was credited with an important role 
in ensuring stability due to its connections to 
local level clan structures and its specialization in 
traditional ways of resolving conflict.  Following the 
presidential elections, the guurti was influential in 
ensuring that the losing candidate accepted the 
constitutional court’s ruling on the election result, 
despite the poll being very close.  In recent years, 
the guurti has been weakened and increasingly 
divided.  Significant concern was expressed about 
the resumption of conflict in Somaliland precisely 
because of the fragility of such institutions.  
In Ethiopia, a major impediment to resolving 
the election dispute was that there was a lack of 
arbiters that could be seen as objective and neutral. 
The Ethiopian Electoral Commission failed to gain 
the confidence of the population and was widely 
perceived to be controlled by the ruling party. Part 
of its failure was that it was not established as an 
institution or in a way that gave confidence to the 
public.  Similarly, international observers, and the 
European Union in particular, were seen by some as 
quick to reach conclusions and/or unprofessionally 
close to certain opposition leaders.
Participants agreed that the greatest responsibility 
for both facilitating violent conflict, and resolving 
it, falls with the government.  The government is, 
after all, the one with the guns.  And in Ethiopia, 
it was argued that the government’s excessively 
heavy-handed approach undermined efforts of 
reconciliation. 
Speakers discussed media factors and focused on 
the negative impact domestic and international 
media can have upon nation building.  At the same 
time, often-overlooked government efforts to 
harness the media for nation-building (both positive 
and negative) was also elaborated. 
The Ethiopian media, both government and 
independent, was seen by some as a major culprit 
in the post-election impasse and exacerbated 
polarization.  In the case of northern Uganda, one 
speaker criticized the standard of reporting from 
the region and described journalism in this case 
as having been more akin to advocacy.  It was, for 
example, noted that European audiences have been 
presented with a picture entirely devoid of political 
analysis and the international media have seized 
upon the notion of ‘traditional’ justice as a means 
to post-conflict reconciliation. Similarly, aid agencies 
have worked on the basis of a flawed understanding 
of local customs and attempted to turn a local ritual 
for defining accountability into a collective healing 
ritual.  The focus on regionally and ‘tribally’ specific 
justice has not made any contribution to national 
integration.
The example of how satellite communication has 
contributed to attempts to foster nationhood and 
consolidate political power in Ethiopia was explored. 
This particular programme, called Woredanet, 
connects local government units to the central 
administration and to each other, primarily through 
video-conferencing.  This enables dissemination of 
information from the centre to the periphery and 
the training of local officials in order to improve 
service delivery around the state. 
The particular way in which media technology has 
been deployed in Ethiopia is related to the specific 
imperatives faced by the state: in this case the desire 
to channel technological capacity towards nation-
building which dictated an emphasis on improving 
service delivery through communications technology 
in order to demonstrate to the population that the 
government was committed to meeting their needs. 
Secondly, the particular ‘culture of communication’ 
of the leadership was influential, referring to the 
mix of theories and practices pursued by a group 
in their approach to communication.  The speaker 
highlighted an Ethiopian preference for empiricism, 
or ‘persuading by doing,’ whereby rather than 
conducting extensive debates over ideology, it is 
demonstrated through practice what is beneficial. 
In relation to Woredanet, this meant that the best 
way to spread good practice was to enable those 
from one area to demonstrate to others how they 
were achieving objectives.
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The role of international actors in supporting 
media systems was discussed.  Drawing on the 
Woredanet example, one participant felt that 
international actors had played a contradictory 
role in the application of technology to Ethiopian 
development objectives.  Dialogue is necessary 
regarding the right of countries to determine their 
own usage of technology within international 
frameworks which offer support to actors when 
systems are abused.   Concern was expressed over 
the tendency to prescribe from the outside and to 
push for normative models that might not fit the 
current context and priorities.
One speaker characterized donor efforts to support 
media and aid their development as hindered by a 
lack of clarity about objectives, inconsistency and a 
low priority in international development strategies. 
Rather than engaging with, and supporting, the 
media system in a particular country, donors 
have often preferred to produce their own media 
outlets.  In relation to elections, support provided 
to the media is often mechanistic and uniform, 
and displays a lack of understanding of the longer 
term relationship between media and elections 
or democracy more broadly.  Programmes have 
focused on training, provision of forums for public 
debate and monitoring of elections, which are not 
necessarily activities for which recipient media 
organizations require support.  Media should be 
seen as part of the broader fabric of democracy 
in line with a recognition that democratic politics 
cannot be reduced to holding elections. 
Whether international criminal justice can assist in 
conflict resolution and post-conflict reconciliation, 
including in the case of election related violence, 
is an important current debate.  The implications 
of ratification of the Rome Statute establishing the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) are being tested 
in central Africa.  The ICC has issued warrants for 
Ugandan nationals and made its first arrest in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in March 2006.  The 
UN Security Council referred the case of Darfur 
to the court in March 2005 and, more recently, 
accused perpetrators of the election violence in 
Kenya may be brought before the ICC unless the 
Kenyan government manages to implement justice 
locally.
The ICC has been criticized by some as incompetent 
and irrelevant to those affected by conflict in Africa. 
It is suggested that pressing criminal charges can 
undermine peace talks and that an ‘African’ version 
of justice may be more effective.  Other criticisms 
of the ICC have been dictated by a preference for 
‘traditional’ justice as discussed above.  In this 
context, many have also questioned whether 
international criminal justice measures actually 
jeopardize prospects for peace.  It was agreed that 
debates on transitional justice are often neglected 
but are an important part in understanding the 
role of the media in election-related violence and 
reconciliation.
Participants returned the notion of incompetence 
and how this can serve to undermine all proposed 
solutions.  It is possible to come up with ideals and 
have ambitious discussions about self-regulation, 
but such solutions are not always realistic or well 
adapted to environments with weak institutions 
and a very fragile political environment.  In thinking 
ahead, restrictions to be placed on the media in 
order to prevent violence and prevent hate speech 
and other abuses of media were discussed.  An 
existing or a new UN agency could oversee this. 
  
KEY FINDINGS
Media systems often reflect the process, or 
failed process, of reconciliation in fragile states 
emerging from war.  In these cases, special 
attention should be given to the role of the 
media in post-war transitional justice processes 
and the potential of the media in undermining 
efforts to build national cohesion.  
In terms of post-election violence, justice that 
attempts to address this  will take different 
forms.  In some cases, the ICC may be a 
valid response while in others, having local 
institutions address violence and disputes may 
be more important for long-term stability and 
development.
International donors often make incorrect 
assumptions about how certain communication 
technologies will be implemented and contribute 
to the political and economic activities of the 
state. Greater focus must be given to how 
governments are ‘reinterpreting’ technology 
for their own political and economic projects in 
line with their vision of national development.
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Session 5: How do Particular Media Practices 
Contribute to Tensions or Promote Peaceful 
Resolutions to Electoral Disputes?
Tim Allen (chair), Linje Manyozo, Alice Klement, 
David Mukholi, Samson Mulugeta, Devra Moehler, 
Ylva Rodny Gumede
The session focused on media factors in the cases as 
variables affecting the likelihood of violent conflict, 
including the availability of relatively new forms 
of technology, levels of press polarization and the 
need for journalistic training.  Regulatory structures 
and state influence of media were discussed, 
particularly in relation to new electronic media and 
mobile phone technology.
The importance of the structure of media systems in 
relation to the existence of public and private media 
and state regulation of media was discussed in the 
case of Ethiopia and Uganda.  At the same time, 
the difficulty in drawing sharp distinctions between 
public and private media was also highlighted as it 
was stressed that government advertising revenues 
were extremely important in many countries.
The state media in Ethiopia are seen by many as 
producing only propaganda, whereas the private 
media are often characterized as being the voice 
of the opposition.  The two media blocs obtain 
information from different sources, as the private 
media for example have little access to the 
government.  This increased polarization in media 
coverage of the 2005 elections.
Although state media had previously been tightly 
controlled in Ethiopia, the government permitted 
an unprecedented level of opposition access to 
media prior to the 2005 polls, which generated 
huge public interest and debate.  The government 
did so on the basis of a false assumption that they 
would attain a large majority in the election.  The 
government was both under international pressure 
to liberalize the media and they also wished to deny 
the opposition any opportunity to delegitimize 
their victory through claims of irregularities during 
the campaign period. However, after the elections, 
when their miscalculation had become apparent, 
the government reverted to restrictive practices. 
In Uganda, the partially government-owned New 
Vision13 is an interesting and important example 
of government media that is both popular and 
comparatively balanced.  New Vision contradicts 
13  http://www.newvision.co.ug
the assumption that state-owned media outlets 
act only as vehicles for propaganda and in the early 
days of the NRM demonstrated that government 
media can have an important role in nation-
building.  Established by an act of parliament, the 
publication has expanded into a large media house 
which now produces several other weeklies and 
plans to establish a television channel. Government 
shares in New Vision have been reduced from 80 to 
53 percent.  The paper has editorial independence 
and has voiced opposition to the government in the 
past.  It was acknowledged that there are difficulties 
in reporting sensitive issues, in particular the conflict 
in northern Uganda, and in covering elections, 
during which the paper comes under government 
pressure to privilege coverage of the government. 
New technology was a focus of the panel.  Means 
of communication, including blogs, sermons and 
SMS messaging that are on the periphery of formal 
media can be highly influential.  The impact of new 
forms of media has been highly significant, for 
example in facilitating transfer of information from 
areas which are difficult for journalists to access, 
such as northern Uganda, and in providing new 
means of establishing social control as previously 
discussed in the case of Ethiopia’s Woredanet. 
Drawing on another case from Ethiopia, blogging 
was highlighted as a contributor to tensions in the 
2005 elections.  Blogs are heavily dominated by the 
diaspora, which in some cases was more polarized 
and strongly opposed to the government than the 
opposition within the country.  
The use of mobile phones was highlighted through 
a discussion on Kenya. The potential for technology 
to fuel violence and, conversely, the benefits 
of technology for democracy and promotion of 
human rights, as well as policy responses to these 
contradictory outcomes, were discussed. Media 
in Kenya played both roles, leading one speaker 
to conclude that in the short term trade-offs may 
be necessary between security and freedom of 
expression. It may be necessary to consider a 
state’s historical legacy to determine whether state 
repression or ethnic violence pose the greatest 
threat in the circumstances.
In terms of encouraging violence, radio shows 
regularly used inflammatory language and 
campaigns were conducted via SMS and email 
which promoted intolerance and violence through 
the dehumanization of groups.  Cell phones were 
key instruments by which misinformation and 
rumour, key contributory factors to the violence, 
were spread.  However, the media also facilitated 
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calls for democratic participation and peace through 
voter mobilization and SMS services which informed 
people about political processes.
The importance of new media forms has an impact 
on potential regulatory structures and government 
response to violence.  In Kenya, suggested measures 
to prevent the use of mobile phones to disseminate 
incitement to violence included closing down 
mobile phone networks. This was opposed by the 
CEO of Safaricom, a leading mobile phone network 
operator in Kenya, who argued that chaos would 
result as phones were also used by displaced people 
to contact relatives and as part of humanitarian 
efforts.  Another potential policy response was 
monitoring and filtering SMS messages, but this 
was complicated by the fact that words used in 
inflammatory messages were difficult to identify 
and screen as metaphors were often used.
Prosecution is difficult because at the time of the 
elections there was no law in place to prohibit 
hate speech spread via mobile phones and as 
most phones in Kenya operate on a pre-pay basis 
it is difficult to track owners down.  A law has since 
been passed to create a database of numbers and 
network users, as recommended by the Kenya 
National Commission for Human Rights.  However, 
it remains possible and fairly cheap to send SMS 
messages from neighbouring Tanzania and Uganda, 
where neither country has such legislation. 
Participants were reminded that there are also 
beneficial ways of harnessing SMS in election 
monitoring—as has been used in Uganda—where 
citizens and reporters observe the elections and text 
in immediate developments at their polling station 
to a newspaper or other central news organization. 
Such results, however, when significantly different 
from ‘official’ statements, can also exacerbate 
tensions.  
In Ethiopia, the sole mobile service provider, 
the state-owned Ethiopian Telecommunication 
Corporation, stopped SMS services for more than 
a year following the May 2005 elections.  One 
speaker felt that this measure possibly contributed 
to a reduction in violence but the move was heavily 
criticized and came at great cost for the reputation 
of the government.
There was a debate over which constitutes the 
greatest threat: ethnic violence or state-imposed 
limits on freedom of expression and control of the 
media.  One participant stressed the desirability of 
censorship once it has been accepted that flows of 
information are influencing violence.  Although it is 
problematic to identify who should be responsible 
for regulating such restrictions, it was proposed that 
an international body could assume responsibility. 
This suggestion was also deemed controversial by 
some participants. 
The place of media monitoring within wider 
election monitoring exercises was discussed. It was 
noted that although there is extensive literature 
which deals with the role of the media in elections, 
stressing the importance of regulations and codes 
of conduct specifically for the post-election period 
is often excluded from handbooks for election 
monitors.
KEY FINDINGS
Government media is often responsible 
for exacerbating violent conflict, provoking 
tensions and polarizing the information space. 
Greater attention should be given to developing 
innovative approaches to government media 
for contributing to nation-building.  The New 
Vision newspaper in the early days of the NRM 
in Uganda is one such example.
SMS has a new and complex role in media 
and post-election violence. It can accelerate 
messages, including rumours but it also serves 
as a tool for monitoring the electoral process. 
The debate over the tension between freedom 
of expression and the role of the media in 
exacerbating conflicts in fragile states is 
difficult to navigate. It should not, however, 
become a debate over freedom of expression 
and censorship- the focus must remain on 
how the media can best contribute to nation-
building. The appropriate approach will differ 
significantly in different countries.  
It is important to be explicit about what is 
referred to as ‘the media’.  It was agreed that it 
is necessary to move beyond consideration of 
journalism, to a broader conception of media. 
The salient ways in which attempts are made 
to influence popular opinion may be missed by 
a focus on the media as traditionally conceived 
by newspapers, tv and radio.
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Session 6: Media Regulation: Hate Speech, 
Violent Conflict, and the Regulation of 
Communication in War and Post-War 
Situations
Mohamed Fadal (chair), Monroe Price, David Levy, 
Derbew Temesgen, Nassanga Goretti
The session explored media regulation in a 
comparative context. The desirability of regulation, 
in principle, and in particular circumstances, was 
discussed. Various state responses to a perceived 
need for regulation were explored with particular 
reference to recent events in Uganda and Ethiopia. 
Key themes that emerged were the difficulty in 
establishing criteria for legitimate intervention in 
media freedom, the efficacy of regulatory tools and 
the relative dangers posed by threats to free speech 
and the threat of ethnic violence.
The discussion began with an overview of types 
of state responses to conflict, in particular in 
relation to the media.  Although regulation is often 
conceptualized as constituted by laws, it can take 
different forms.  States have, for example, used 
extra-legal means such as intimidation and force 
in order to affect elections or to manage post-
election circumstances.  Recommendations by the 
government as to the type of ‘discourse’ the media 
should employ can also be used.  One example is 
the case of the Indian government after the terrorist 
attacks on Mumbai when the Indian Ministry of 
Information issued advice to editors that videos of 
the attacks should not be broadcast, but did not 
invoke the threat of legal sanction.
The issue of defining when restriction of media 
freedom is justified or required was debated. 
Deciding what constitutes hate speech remains 
difficult.  One speaker discussed decision-making 
related to modes of intervention when hate 
speech is broadcast.  He expressed unease about 
the application of templates for regulation across 
different places.  It is necessary to address the 
following points in each distinct context: which 
approaches should be employed, in terms of 
mechanisms and goals of intervention; what is 
legitimate in a particular context; and what is 
effective.  This varies according to temporality, 
levels of technology, the political situation and the 
political culture existing in a location. 
The importance of ethnicity within a state was re-
emphasized as an important factor, including for 
regulatory issues.  One speaker asked whether it 
remained necessary to monitor occurrences of hate 
speech in countries without pronounced ethnic 
polarization. 
The case of regulation in Ethiopia was discussed. 
When the ruling EPRDF came to power, freedom 
of the press was enshrined in law and censorship, 
strongly enforced by previous regimes, was 
officially abolished.  This facilitated a proliferation 
of publications in many languages.  However, as 
the power of the EPRDF slowly eroded, direct 
confrontation between the government and 
the press became more common.  Following 
the elections, more than twenty journalists 
were arrested on charges of treason and it was 
claimed that they had attempted to overthrow the 
constitution. 
A new press law in Ethiopia has recently been 
adopted.  It demonstrates many improvements from 
the previous press law, but implementation poses 
a major challenge.   While the new law contains 
a progressive freedom of information clause, 
it is unlikely to have significant impact as most 
Ethiopians are wary of pressing the government for 
information and there is not a culture of government 
dissemination of information.
In Uganda, several regulatory tools affecting the 
media were in place during the 2006 elections, 
including laws relating to terrorism, electronic media 
and defamation and a media code of ethics.  Media 
outlets are expected take a balanced approach to all 
candidates during an election; in practice, however, 
the incumbent received more media coverage and 
the printed press favoured candidates.  As the 
election approached, the government established a 
media centre in the capital, Kampala, through which 
it attempted to assert greater control, particularly 
in relation to foreign journalists. 
One speaker concluded, in accordance with the 
guidelines of the European Union, that self-
regulation during election times, including through 
such measures as codes of ethics, is not sufficient 
to ensure pluralism and equal access to the media 
for all.  Independent media councils are one option 
for self-regulation, but the example of Uganda’s 
Media Council, which did not fulfill its role, is 
indicative of the lack of capacity and competence 
these organizations may have.  The Media Council 
was under-resourced and its weakness left space 
for government influence and control. 
As was highlighted in the previous session, the 
proliferation of new media poses particular 
challenges in terms of effective regulation. It 
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becomes more difficult to judge what action to 
take to restrict outputs.  Methods of intervention 
attempted in these cases have been very crude and 
pose significant threats to freedom of expression, 
for example the shutting down of entire SMS 
networks. 
The question of who should be responsible for 
regulation of the media was discussed.  Participants 
considered the merits of government regulation, 
with some expressing doubts about this approach. 
One participant thought it unlikely that government 
regulation would be an appropriate response to 
the growing problem and suggested that more 
sophisticated forms of regulation could form part 
of a solution.  The potential role of civil society and 
the private sector as well as international actors in 
media monitoring was raised.
It was pointed out that much funding in this area is 
premised on the desirability of promoting freedom 
of speech as an end in itself, which proves to be a 
complicated endeavor in fragile states.  However, 
another participant countered that freedom of 
expression was a crucial factor in building political 
institutions; in environments where the problem is 
likely to be one of too little rather than too much 
freedom of speech, excessive regulation carries the 
risk of impeding the development of deliberation and 
discussion through the media. The independence 
and the institutionalization of regulatory bodies 
were regarded as crucial in setting the tone for 
media regulation. 
KEY FINDINGS
Code of conduct for journalists typically focus 
on the pre-election and voting day(s) period 
but they should include specific provisions for 
the post-election period, particularly when 
there is obvious concern about disputes over 
the results. 
Media regulation has to be debated and updated 
to address issues of new technology including 
controversial issues such as the monitoring of 
SMS for hate speech.
Whether or not legislation is passed, all 
stakeholders should negotiate post-election 
media policies prior to elections. Such issues 
include policies on restriction of the live 
broadcast of violence, and the shutting down of 
radio stations or SMS in the case of incitement 
to violence.
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Session 7: Upcoming Elections
Bernard Tabaire (chair), Elwathig Kameir, Mohamed 
Fadal
Drawing on previous discussion, this session looked 
to forthcoming elections in the region and the 
role of the media in the electoral process in Sudan 
and Somaliland.  The case studies revisited issues 
which had been raised earlier in the proceedings, 
including the role of international criminal justice in 
exacerbating or resolving conflict, state monopoly 
and regulation of the media, the role of the diaspora 
in media provision and the role and legitimacy of 
institutions mandated to conduct elections.
In accordance with Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA), elections are scheduled for 2010, 
with a referendum on Sudanese unity to follow 
in 2011.  A free and fair election monitored by all 
stakeholders was described as crucial to prevent 
post-election violence and to persuade residents of 
southern Sudan to vote for unity in the forthcoming 
referendum. 
Key obstacles faced in achieving the above 
objectives are the prevalence of mismanagement 
within the Sudanese government.  In addition to 
this, laws which restrict freedom of expression and 
organization for individuals, political parties and the 
media in contravention of the CPA and the Interim 
National Constitution have not yet been amended. 
Censorship of newspapers and the harassment, 
detention and torture of media practitioners have 
also been increasing as the government becomes 
more concerned about political challenges.
The general population census, which will be 
used for the upcoming elections, was delayed. In 
addition, questions relating to religion and ethnicity 
were omitted from it, which has led southern 
Sudanese to dispute the results. It is suspected that 
the ruling party will seek to manipulate the results 
in order to determine electoral constituencies to 
their advantage.
Full participation in the Sudanese elections will be 
impossible, as demarcation of the border between 
north and south remains a contentious issue and 
the conflict in Darfur continues.  At the same time, 
partial elections that exclude large areas of Darfur 
could have serious political consequences.
The incumbent National Congress Party’s 
(NCP) monopoly over the material, human and 
institutional resources of the state, and in particular 
the media, restricts the ability of other political 
actors to compete on an equal basis in the elections. 
Other political forces, including the Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), suffer 
from organizational weakness, remoteness from 
their support bases, lack of resources and internal 
divisions, which will pose an additional challenge in 
competitive elections.
Another issue that threatens to jeopardize the 
electoral process is the indictment of President 
Bashir by the International Criminal Court. 
Unexpectedly, this appears to have strengthened 
the position of the ruling party and in some respects 
has broadened the space for dissent and media 
freedoms as the government is more confident of 
its domestic support.  
It was argued that it is likely the elections in Sudan 
will be disputed, and possibly accompanied by 
violence.  However, any analysis must situate 
events in the context of the overall transitional 
developments as media is only one factor in fuelling 
or preventing post-election violence.
In Somaliland, the Presidential elections were set 
to take place in September 2009.14 The elections 
have been repeatedly delayed and Somaliland’s 
three political parties and the National Electoral 
Commission (NEC) have come together under 
intense public pressure to extend the president’s 
term.  The most recent agreement endorsed the 
resolution of the Somaliland House of Elders 
delaying the presidential election for one year, until 
27 September 2009, and extending the incumbent’s 
term in office until 29 October 2009.  In early 
September, however, the government announced 
that the poll has been further delayed. The elections 
have been delayed for numerous reasons but one 
issue has been the voter registration process.  The 
ambitious campaign to register all eligible voters, 
heavily supported by donors, was intended to 
minimize the potential for double-voting, but it has 
also led to distrust in the entire voter registration 
process.  By international standards, registration has 
been thorough and includes a biometric system with 
a database registering fingerprints, photographs 
and personal details.  Undoubtedly the use of such 
advanced technology has also had drawbacks. 
After the October 2008 bombing by Al Shabaab, 
the foreign staff that was in charge of running the 
computer equipment for the registration pulled 
out, severely delaying the registration process. 
14  As this report went to press, the September 2009 elections 
were further delayed.  See part 4, appendix A for more information 
on this.
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The repeated postponement of the elections, 
however, has led to a constitutional crisis and there 
is no immediate solution in sight. 
When the elections do eventually occur there are 
many potential sources of violent conflict that 
are of concern.  The Electoral Commission is not 
independent and is unqualified.  Much confidence 
has been lost in the voter registration process. 
And there is a lot at stake for candidates who are 
competing in elections for the second time and for 
those who do not wish to relinquish government 
posts. 
In relation to the media, a speaker highlighted that 
most new media, which exert a significant influence, 
are controlled by the diaspora.  The diaspora is 
deeply involved in Somaliland’s politics- not only are 
remittances Somaliland’s most significant source of 
revenue but many politicians are actually recent 
returnees from the Diaspora. 
In general, the local media lacks professionalism. 
There is only one domestically-based radio station 
which does not reach far out of the capital, 
Hargeysa.  Similarly, the diffusion of newspapers is 
mainly confined to the capital.  Satellite television 
and mobile phones are a popular way of exchanging 
news and disseminating information beyond 
Hargeysa.
The speaker encouraged Somaliland to learn from 
the cases of Kenya and Ethiopia.  Hope was expressed 
that the government owned Radio Hargeysa and 
the government television station would succumb 
to domestic pressure to permit similar airtime to all 
parties.
26
part 3: conclusions and 
recommendations
This section of the report draws out some 
conclusions from the conference and proposes a 
framework for analyzing the role of the media in 
post-election violence.  We apply the categories 
of mirror, enabler and amplifier to understand 
the media’s role in post-election violence and 
examine how the media can also be a valuable 
tool for predicting the likelihood of violence.   We 
will then suggest some policy recommendations 
for stakeholders to consider. Rather than offering 
a templates approach to policy or regulation, we 
argue that the most important aspect of these 
recommendations will be the facilitation of dialogue 
and debate about their relevance and applicability 
to a particular context. 
Our focus is on recommendations for media 
environments in the world’s poorest countries 
and fragile states.  While today’s media systems 
are diverse, there is far greater access to 
communications platforms such as Twitter or blogs 
in high and middle-income countries such as the 
United States or Iran than in low-income Ethiopia. 
This is changing, as we have seen with the rapid 
increase of mobile technology in Kenya, but we 
have limited our scope to lessons that emerged 
from the workshop and from related research we 
have conducted in Africa.  While limited, we believe 
that these recommendations will have resonance 
beyond the continent as well.  
Analytic Framework
Effective analysis of the media and political context 
can suggest warning signs of possible post-election 
violence.  Although election observers claimed that 
the 2005 elections in Ethiopia were on track to 
be free and fair, there were strong signals during 
the run-up to the election that any outcome that 
did not overwhelmingly favor the ruling party 
would be strongly contested.  While the election 
preparations were certainly more fair and balanced 
than in 2000 when the opposition was intimidated 
by the government, a more historical and holistic 
approach, including analysis of the ruling party’s 
ideology on democracy would have suggested that 
truly free and fair elections would be impossible. 
Similarly, there should have been warning signs 
that Kenya’s 2007 elections could be explosive. 
After all, the country experienced election-related 
violence during every election since 2002.  In the 
quest to implement idealized electoral systems, 
often because of external pressure, the political 
reality can be obscured. 
Analyzing these factors, particularly in a comparative 
context, can help predict how the media-political 
nexus will function.   This analysis, in turn, will 
facilitate better understanding of the potential 
likelihood of pre, post, or election day violence, 
as well as the nature of the violence and possible 
avenues for resolution. We also suggest that an 
analysis of these factors is an important starting 
point for developing any set of media reforms.
This analytic approach draws on the research 
questions that Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm 
posed in Four Theories of the Press, which have 
been readdressed most recently in Daniel Hallin and 
Paolo Mancini’s Comparing Media Systems.15  The 
contribution of these two works, especially that of 
Hallin and Mancini, to the field of communication 
studies lies less in the typologies or models they 
define but in their analysis of both political and 
media factors.   Our effort here is to consider a 
somewhat different approach, more context-
appropriate, of identifying variables for examination 
in post-election environments in East Africa.  
Both Schramm et. al. and Hallin and Mancini 
focus on the role of the printed press.  We also 
believe that the press has a particularly important 
role, especially in the East African context, and 
provides the best vehicle for viewing the media’s 
role as a mirror.  In addition, it is an accessible and 
manageable medium for a comprehensive analysis. 
Charles Onyango-Obbo, a founding editor of the 
Monitor newspaper in Uganda, argued that in his 
country it is the print media that really matters 
because:
In print you have the policy debate. In Africa you 
cannot have policy debates in any sensible way in 
the broadcast media. For call-in shows in Uganda 
and a lot of Africa their function is for people to 
vent.  People go home after they have vented.  They 
don’t actually call so their point of view can form 
the basis of government action but they call spur-
of-the-moment.  It is not recorded.  But the people 
that write in the media are very meticulous, they do 
their research, it is the intellectual forum.16
The press, as Onyango-Obbo implied, remains 
15  Hallin and Mancini, Comparing Media Systems.
16  Interview: Charles Onyango-Obbo
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the realm of the intellectuals and elites.   Print 
journalists in the countries considered in this report 
have also had substantially more freedoms than 
their electronic counterparts and have been very 
active during and after their countries’ transitions 
from civil war.  Thus this research builds upon the 
experience of the press as a forum, both effectively 
and ineffectively utilized, for the negotiation of power 
between different factions, including elites and the 
government.  The government has an important 
role in shaping this national dialogue through the 
printed press, but it is often overlooked.
Media as an Amplifier
The media by nature act as an amplifier.  How much 
they amplify and what they amplify is determined 
by how they perform the mirror function and how 
committed they are (or are structured to be) in 
terms of an enabling function.  An “independent” 
media or a media acting as a mirror with a strongly 
different perspective of the nation or state from 
that of the government may serve to weaken 
government.    
The use of new technologies, including mobile 
phones and SMS messaging, and the proliferation 
of radio stations, among other factors, facilitates 
and accelerates the spread of messages in a 
less controllable way.  While technology does 
not necessarily alter the message (rumours and 
stereotypes that have been propagated for decades 
are still central in much post-election violence) it 
greatly speeds up the ways in which such messages 
penetrate communities and mobilize individuals 
and groups for action.  The workshop indicated 
that much more needs to be understood about this 
amplifying role and how governments and political 
parties react.  In Kenya, the government intervened 
to impede amplification.   The development of 
ethical standards or codes of conduct and the use 
of regulation to guide the amplifying role is an 
important area for further study.
In probing the role of media as an amplifier, a 
recurring question from the workshop is what 
we mean by “media” in particular societies and, 
subsequently, what is the role of different ”media” in 
effecting the resolution of disputes or exacerbating 
tensions.  This is a question of mapping “information 
ecologies” and distilling the particular uses and 
influence of media outlets.  Different media have 
varying roles in particular contexts.  While our focus 
in this report has been on media such as the press 
and SMS, we consider “media” to be much broader, 
extending beyond “‘journalism” to include a variety 
of communication tools.  Analysts and policymakers 
should be aware of and consider what avenues of 
communication will be considered most reliable 
for different societies, population segments and 
messages. 
In our study, much of our interest is in the role of 
the printed press, radio and television, but the cases 
we consider in this report have varying information 
ecologies.  In Somaliland, for example, with only 
one national radio station, the role of poetry, as 
a medium, and mosques, as an outlet, may be 
more important avenues for the dissemination of 
particular messages than in Uganda where there 
are many radio stations.  
New technology emerged as a particularly salient 
actor in spreading information during post-election 
disputes.  While there has been much international 
media coverage of the role of Twitter in the post-
election dispute in Iran, SMS and blogs currently 
play a more important role in Eastern Africa.   
SMS, for example, was a critical tool in mobilizing 
protests in Ethiopia and Kenya, as the Ethiopian 
government’s efforts to shut down SMS services 
after the YEAR post-election violence attests.  It was 
also effective in spreading rumours, which often 
confused fact and fiction.   Rumours have always 
been part of the political landscape, but it is now far 
easier for local rumours to go national in minutes.17 
Part of the power of texting lies in its perceived 
anonymity.  As one Kenyan blogger lamented, 
anonymous messages spread rapidly among Kenya’s 
nine million cell phone users: “One person sends 
it to five, those five send it to 20, those 20 send 
it to 100, and so it spreads… It is more dangerous 
because there is more stealth to it.  It is not done 
in the open, it is done in secret, making it harder to 
put an end to.”18
Media as a mirror
Analyzing the media as mirror incorporates the 
idea of objectivity and capacity to inform the public 
(and the government) when there are significant 
problems or when progress is being made.  The 
media can be an accurate mirror or present a 
distorted reflection.   They can provide insight 
into, or mask, political dynamics and the level of 
dialogue within a society.  The media can be an 
indicator of how polarized a society is, the progress 
of reconciliation and the possible avenues for the 
17  Osborn, “Fuelling the Flames,” 316.
18  BBC Monitoring Africa, “Kenya: Mobile phones’ messages of 
hate.”
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peaceful resolution of any election-related disputes. 
We believe that the challenge is how to make the 
media a more reliable mirror—a mirror that can be 
an early indicator of the potential for violence or 
reconciliation and can be relied upon by internal 
and external observers.  In our consideration of the 
media as a mirror, we also seek to question how 
observers can better understand and analyze what 
the mirror might be projecting.  
In an attempt to answer this, our analysis has 
produced a set of variables that we consider 
important to understanding media functioning in 
the relevant states.  The prevailing idea is that the 
interactions between the political system and the 
media system are products of specific historical 
experiences; the theoretical problem is seeking to 
define criteria by which one media system can be 
differentiated from another.   We provide these 
factors as a beginning framework:
Historical Pathways:
How the government came to power: such as • 
through a guerrilla insurgency or through an 
election
The nation-building process, including • 
reconciliation and the role of transitional justice 
efforts
Media Structure:
Regulatory structure and media ownership• 
Ideology and professionalism of journalists, • 
including the quality of the industry’s 
leadership 
Prevalence, nature, use and diversity of media • 
sources, including the role of mobile phones, 
mosques, blogs and newspapers
Government communication strategy (or lack • 
thereof)
Electoral System:
Type of electoral system (such as first-past-the-• 
post or the two round system) 
Transparency of the election process• 
The role of election observers (both domestic • 
and international)
Political Structure:
Type of politics: for example: ethnic, communal, • 
clan or class-based
Legitimacy of the institutions, including the • 
rule of law, level of corruption and the capacity 
of the government to act independently and 
resolve disputes 
Ideology and quality of the leadership, including • 
the willingness to relinquish power
International dimensions: what are the interests • 
of other states and who are the international 
actors supporting?
Media as an enabler
Finally, the media’s role as an enabler involves the 
press as a supporter of the government’s nation- 
and state-building project.  This has emerged as 
the crucial issue in understanding media and post-
election violence both from our previous research 
as well as during the context of this workshop. 
By media as an enabler we imply the ways in 
which the media might perform a positive role in 
transitional justice processes, including by creating a 
national identity; mediating divergent perspectives 
and negotiating political power, particularly among 
elites, on a national vision; and serving as a space 
for dialogue to reduce polarization.  As elaborated 
during the workshop proceedings, the media, and 
particularly the press, provide an important space 
for elite negotiation in many parts of Africa.19  The 
media serve as a forum for competing political 
actors to vie for power and to offer alternatives to 
the national project.  This is both a strength and 
weakness. 
It is a strength because it means that the media, 
and the press in particular, can be a valuable space 
for reconciliation and dialogue between competing 
political perspectives.  When perspectives are 
engaged effectively this can help to reduce 
polarization, and further define and consolidate the 
state- and nation-building agenda. 
But the media’s ability to serve as a forum is a 
weakness for fragile states that may not have the 
institutions to manage this kind of discussion. 
Similarly, it may be feared that the media will be 
used for further polarization by propagating the 
agenda of an ethnic group or clan rather than a 
19  See also Stremlau, The Press and Consolidation of Power in 
Ethiopia and Uganda, and Price, Al Marashi and Stremlau, “Media 
in the Peace-Building Process.”
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space for dialogue.   One example of this case is 
Somaliland where we have been leading a research 
project on flows of information.  One preliminary 
finding from this research is that a significant portion 
of Somalilanders are reluctant to have more than 
one radio station; the fear is that without sufficient 
regulation private radios could become instruments 
of clan agendas.  The freedom of expression that 
such outlets would provide is deemed not worth 
the potential collateral of a return to violence after 
decades of civil war.  In this case, the consideration 
for not encouraging or allowing, at least for the 
time being, a proliferation of competition on the 
airwaves should not be viewed as censorship or 
restriction of freedom, but a question of sequencing 
and conscientious state-building. 
The academic and policy literature on media 
development tends to regard the transitions 
of both political and media systems, as linear. 
However, post-election violence, particularly of the 
kind we have recently seen in Ethiopia and Kenya, 
demonstrates not just autocratic backsliding but a 
more fundamental weakness, and even failure, of 
the entire nation and state-building projects.
Thus, when we look at the role of the media as an 
enabler, the prevailing argument—that the media 
were not free enough, or that the government 
unjustly clamped down on freedom of expression—
must be further interrogated.  In many cases this 
is undoubtedly true.  But continuously focusing on 
the importance of media freedom obscures more 
significant, and foundational, questions about 
political power, institutions and sequencing. 
Peace, like other political projects, is an ideological 
conquest that at times must be imposed.  There 
are very few examples of effective use of the 
media for nation-building in Africa, partly because 
nation-building itself has been so problematic.  One 
seemingly successful example is Tanzania under its 
first president, Julius Nyerere.   Nyerere, a former 
journalist, had strong beliefs on how the media 
should contribute to Ujamaa, the country’s scientific 
socialist project.  The media were harnessed 
to promote the use of Swahili as the national 
language as well as a national identity and a shared 
national vision.  Such issues are often at the root 
of the violence, but are generally excluded from 
discussions of media policy in post-war situations. 
While today’s failures of nation-building may stem 
from a lack of vision from the leadership, or from 
the overriding struggle for access to resources, 
a significant, and often overlooked challenge for 
many of the countries examined in this report is 
to develop a strategy for the media to effectively 
contribute to developing a consensus on what the 
nation is, while building a viable state.20
Conclusions and Recommendations for Media 
Policy in the Post-Election Period
Several key issues arose throughout the workshop, 
and have been briefly summarized in the “Key 
Findings” for each workshop session. In light of 
the conference summary and the above discussion 
which considers the role of the media as an amplifier, 
mirror and enabler, we offer here some selected 
recommendations for policymakers, international 
donors, journalists and governments.  The following 
points also suggest areas for future comparative 
research and policy development.  They are in no 
particular order. 
Government responsibility 
Legitimate institutions are central to effectively 
resolving election disputes.  But in building 
institutional capacity, and relying on existing 
institutions for preventing violence, it is important 
not to lose sight of reality, and consider what is 
functioning best in the present circumstance.  The 
case of the courts in Somaliland illustrates this 
point.  There, the government court system is the 
least respected and used by the people.  In contrast, 
customary law and customary justice take care of 
80 percent of the cases and Shari’a law concerns 
itself with family affairs.  The judiciary and courts 
system is the weakest link in the legal system and is 
seen as being closely aligned with the government. 
The high court is appointed by the president, and 
has never ruled against the government.  Thus, 
when considering effective institutions for conflict 
resolution and electoral disputes in Somaliland, 
alternative dispute resolution methods, such as the 
guurti (the House of Elders) or coalitions of other 
elders or intellectuals are likely to offer a more 
viable solution.  
20  This is not to say that we are advocating a return to what was 
known in the 1970s and 1980s as ‘developmental media’ which 
was essentially government propaganda. Media for nation-building 
first and foremost requires political leadership with an enlightened 
vision.  Such leaders have been admittedly rare in Africa but such 
projects should never the less be encouraged and progressive 
media policy designed to support such projects. 
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Type of Election
The type and nature of electoral system, especially in 
fragile states, plays a potential role in the occurrence 
of post-election violence.  It was generally agreed 
that winner takes all systems—also referred to as 
first-past-the-post—are more risky.  These systems 
are largely a colonial legacy, and there has been little 
initiative, either on the part of national governments 
or international supporters, to alter this.  Emphasis 
should be placed on not what is ideal but what is 
most effective in representing citizens but least 
likely to exacerbate or reignite violent conflict. 
Access to State Media Outlets
It is important to ensure that state broadcasters 
provide mutually agreed upon and acceptable access 
to all political parties participating in an election. 
In the case of disputes, the state broadcaster has 
a particular role in advancing reconciliation and 
encouraging peace.  Even it if it is unlikely that a 
law on political coverage before, during and after 
elections will be promulgated in time, the process 
of drafting it and the involvement of all stakeholders 
is a valuable exercise in dialogue and awareness-
raising.  Even if the document is not perfect, it is 
more important to engage in a process of complex 
domestic negotiation rather than simply accepting 
an “ideal” template drafted by an external actor.
Inter-media Dialogue
Dialogue and cooperation within the media sector 
should be encouraged.  This will help to reduce 
polarization and facilitates the media’s role as a 
space for elite negotiation.  Given that much of 
the power lies with the government, government 
actors  must take a leading role in this area by 
responding to criticisms leveled at them within the 
media, answering questions posed by journalists 
from media outlets that might be aligned with 
other political parties, and showing extra sensitivity 
regarding statements that might further polarize 
the media environment. 
Partisanship and Endorsements
The question of whether newspapers should 
endorse candidates or parties should be addressed 
at an early stage.  At the very least, journalists and 
media owners should be aware of the complexities 
of this issue as elaborated in this report.
Release of Public Opinion Results
Public opinion polling organizations, the government 
and media should closely consider how to report 
and predict outcomes of elections, recognizing 
the potential of predictions to raise expectations 
and inflame violence.  Issues to consider include 
possible restrictions on releasing polling data within 
a pre-determined period prior to the elections, or 
publicizing the methodology of polling as well as 
the fact that polling results often swing significantly 
in the days before the election. 
Announcement of Election Results
A process for announcing election results should 
be discussed and agreed upon prior to the election 
along with procedures for its implementation.
Live Broadcasts of Violence
If coverage of violence is to be restricted (either 
through SMS, radio coverage, live television 
broadcast, or other means), the arguments for 
doing so must be made explicit and complemented 
by a strategy for addressing grievances.  This should 
be discussed with all stakeholders prior to the 
elections. Comprehensive media monitoring should 
serve to provide warning signs and be a part of any 
regulation process. 
SMS and Rumours
Media regulation has not been adapted to the latest 
advances in technology.  Special consideration must 
be given to the role of SMS in spreading rumours. 
Policies on monitoring originators of messages of 
incitement should be considered and discussed with 
private companies prior to the election.  Monitoring 
and actions to stop the spread of rumours (if 
necessary) must be carried out by an independent 
committee or institution. 
Media Policies and Liberalization of the 
Airwaves
Given the fragility of many states in Africa, special 
consideration needs to be given to the role of 
private radio stations.  Professionalism is certainly 
a major problem but there are deeper questions 
of ownership and political-economic agendas 
that warrant careful consideration.  International 
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advocates may push for a “marketplace of ideas,” 
but liberalizing media space does not always 
immediately lead to a perfect flowering and mix of 
voices.  Extensive dialogue and consultations with 
all stakeholders and citizens (including through 
perceptions and polling research) should direct 
media policies in this area.  
Media Monitoring and the Post-Election Period
Media monitoring mechanisms should be put in 
place prior to the election.  Ideally this would be 
carried out by a university or other independent 
research institution.  Government-owned media 
would be monitored for access and all media would 
be monitored for hate speech or incitement.  This 
should be an on-going project in the pre- and post-
election period as well as the election period itself.
Codes of Conduct 
Codes of conduct that are common for journalists 
during the pre-election and voting periods should 
give significant attention to the post-election period 
as well, focusing particularly on how journalists 
cover disputes and violence.  While codes of conduct 
are important, all sides must be realistic about the 
difficulty of actually enforcing or implementing 
them.  The process of negotiating the drafting of the 
code should be given particular attention for its role 
in raising awareness, deepening understanding of 
the issues at hand and developing consensus among 
all stakeholders about the role of the media. 
Sensitization About Hate Speech
In some cases, laws and definitions of hate speech 
are muddled.  While they may not be easily or 
quickly clarified, a dialogue about hate speech, what 
it might include and how thinly-veiled references 
to violence can also constitute hate speech is 
important.  Recognizing that most media are partisan 
in the countries we are discussing, considering how 
“the other side” might perceive a message is an 
important component of sensitizing stakeholders 
to what may be perceived as provocative or hate 
speech. 
Conclusion 
As events throughout the world indicate, these 
questions of post-election violence and their 
relationship to the media seem to be mounting in 
importance and relevance.   Our workshop began to 
identify specific means for thinking through issues 
of avoidance and prevention.  But obviously there 
is far more to do.  The project has already sought 
to work with governing structures in Somaliland 
where a close previous election, intense contest 
and several delays provide indicators of potential 
later violence.  We continue to monitor contexts 
where these factors appear.  Among the goals 
of the workshop and this report is to sharpen 
attention to these issues, to develop lines of future 
research, and to clarify options for decision makers. 
Ultimately, avoiding violence—whether during the 
post-election period or at another time—turns on 
the legitimacy of the institutional processes and 
the trust among the segments of the population. 
These pillars of governance are still too seldom 
solidly present.  In their absence close attention 
to the connections between media structure and 
performance, on the one hand, and post-election 
violence, on the other, continues to be  necessary. 
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part 4: appendix and bibliography
Appendix A: Eastern African Cases
This section briefly introduces the cases discussed in 
the workshop. Ethiopia and Kenya both experienced 
post-election violence during their recent elections. 
Tanzania and Uganda had minimal violence, 
although Tanzania’s elections were notably more 
competitive.  The final two countries, Somaliland 
and Sudan, will be holding crucial elections in 
2010 that appear set to be competitive and highly 
contentious.21  We look ahead to the challenges 
they face and the potential for disputed results. 
Ethiopia
Ethiopia’s legislative elections of 15 May 2005 were 
the most competitive in the history of the country. 
A high level of public debate characterized the 
campaign period, and the government permitted 
opposition parties an unprecedented level of access 
to state media outlets, including live broadcasts of 
political debates.  There were well-attended and 
peaceful pre-election rallies and voter turnout was 
extremely high. 
Although the campaign was not entirely peaceful 
and there were many reports of intimidation of 
opposition supporters, voting itself was largely 
conducted in a transparent and orderly manner. 
However, on the evening of polling day, Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi announced a month-long 
ban on demonstrations in the capital, Addis Ababa, 
and took direct control of the city’s police and 
militia.  The ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) then proceeded to claim 
victory, although the National Electoral Board of 
Ethiopia (NEBE) had not yet announced any results. 
Opposition parties responded with claims of fraud 
and rigging and subsequently made their own 
claims of victory. 
Protests occured across the country, but 
predominantly in Addis Ababa, over alleged 
irregularities in the polling process. These were 
dealt with harshly by security forces.  Dozens were 
killed and tens of thousands arrested. Following 
21  After a number of delays, Somaliland’s elections were most 
recently scheduled for September 2009, but they have been further 
postponed. A new date has not yet been set. Ethiopia will also be 
holding elections in 2010 but they are unlikely to be competitive. 
the wave of protests, opposition party leaders and 
supporters were arrested and charged with treason. 
The government blamed opposition parties for 
inciting violence and seeking to undermine the 
Ethiopian state. 
After the election, the Ethiopian government began 
to restrict freedom of the press and civil society 
organizations, reversing the measures that had 
made the state media more accessible to opposition 
parties during the campaign period.  Private media 
were also restricted and many journalists were 
arrested or forced into hiding.  Most diaspora-run 
websites were blocked and the country’s sole mobile 
telephone and internet service provider, the state-
owned Ethiopian Telecommunications Corporation 
(ETC), ceased SMS services to subscribers, citing the 
need to carry out maintenance work.
Both the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front and the Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy had used SMS messaging as part of 
their campaign strategies and messages had been 
used in the organization of protests following the 
elections.
The service remained unavailable for more than two 
years until the eve of the Ethiopian Millennium in 
September 2007.  As midnight approached, mobile 
phone owners received an SMS signed from the 
head of ETC wishing them a Happy New Year and 
advising them that the SMS service would shortly 
be available. 
Kenya
Kenyans voted in record numbers in parliamentary 
and presidential elections on 27 December 2007. 
The election was extremely close.  In the weeks 
preceding the Kenyan contest, some opinion polls 
found less than two percentage points separating 
sitting president Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader 
Raila Odinga.22  Although early election returns gave 
the opposition ODM a lead of one million votes, 
the race later narrowed to a tie, and final results 
announced by the Electoral Commission of Kenya 
(ECK) put Kibaki ahead by 200,000 votes.23  Serious 
irregularities in vote tallying were reported by 
election observers and by staff of the ECK.  These 
included a report of 115 percent turnout in the 
Maragua District, a Kibaki stronghold, and the 
alleged addition of 25,000 pro-Kibaki votes in the 
22  NTV (Kenyan Television), “Kenya: Opposition presidential 
aspirant Odinga maintains lead in opinion polls.”
23  Gettleman, “Disputed Vote Plunges Kenya into Bloodshed.”
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Rift Valley town of Molo.24 
The widespread belief that Kibaki’s party (PNU) had 
rigged the election was instrumental in provoking the 
violence that followed the election.  Announcement 
of the election results was delayed for three days 
while ECK commissioners wrestled with conflicting 
vote tallies and an increasingly restive press corps. 
The opposition complained that ECK commissioners, 
of which 19 of a total of 22 were appointed by 
Kibaki, were doctoring the results, and the final 
press conference at which results were announced 
was disrupted by scuffles between opposition 
party members and the police.25  Nevertheless, the 
ECK declared Kibaki the winner.  Just five minutes 
after the announcement, Kibaki attended a hastily-
organized swearing-in ceremony, and within 15 
minutes rioting was underway in the slums of 
Nairobi and cities such as Mombasa and Kisumu. 
European Union election observers concluded that 
the Kenyan general election had “fallen short of key 
international and regional standards for democratic 
elections,” and provided ample evidence of shifting 
vote totals that suggested a pattern of abuse.26  
In subsequent two months of conflict, more than 
1,000 Kenyans were killed and up to 350,000 
displaced.  Violence was used both between citizens 
and by security forces against those disputing the 
election results.27 
Uganda
Uganda held presidential, parliamentary and local 
council elections on 23 February 2006.  These 
were the first multiparty elections since 1980, 
following a referendum on the re-introduction 
of multiparty competition in 2005.  Prior to the 
polls, the constitution was altered to abolish a 
two-term limit for the presidency in order to 
permit incumbent Yoweri Museveni to run for the 
third time.   Museveni’s principal challenger, Kizza 
Besigye, of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), 
was arrested and charged with offences including 
treason and rape in the period preceding voting 
day. 
Results released on 25 February showed Museveni 
to have won 59 percent of the votes with Besigye 
24  Dagne, “Kenya: The December 2007 Elections and the 
Challenges Ahead.”.
25  Bloomfield, “Kenya in Flames over ‘Stolen Election.’”
26  European Union Election Observation Mission, “Kenya 
General Election Preliminary Statement.”
27  “Report of the Findings of the Commission of Inquiry into 
Post-Election Violence,” 345, 351.
attaining 37 percent.  Besigye, citing fraud, 
challenged the results in the Supreme Court. 
Although a majority of the bench agreed there 
had been electoral irregularities, the result of the 
election was upheld.
The election period itself experienced some 
violence, including clashes between supporters 
of Museveni’s National Revolutionary Movement 
(NRM) and those of the FDC in the pre-election 
period preceding, and numerous cases of 
intimidation by security forces on election day were 
reported by the press.  However, the level of overt 
intimidation and violence was lower than in 2001, 
when 17 people died as a result of election-related 
violence.  Improved management of the elections, 
by the Electoral Commission in particular, has been 
cited as a contribution to the improved situation. 
There were examples of state intervention in media 
freedom before and during the polls, including 
intimidation and arrest of broadcasters and blocking 
of radio signals when election results were being 
reported. The Ugandan media provided 
outlets for expression of discontent and grievances. 
Hundreds of bimeeza (radio talk shows) allowed 
aggrieved parties to voice their complaints, and 
there was lively discussion in the opinion pages of 
newspapers.
The Daily Monitor produced its own benchmarks for 
coverage of the election which were communicated 
to representatives of political parties.   Parties were 
invited to complain if they felt that their candidate 
was not receiving adequate coverage.  As the 23 
February polls were taking place, The Monitor carried 
out an independent tally of the votes as they were 
announced by polling stations.  This was broadcast 
on an affiliated radio station, KFM.  The Managing 
Director of the Monitor Group, Conrad Nkutu, 
claimed to have faced significant pressure from 
the Broadcasting Council, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, the Electoral Commission and the police 
to refrain from compiling results independently. 
Results reported suggested that Museveni would 
not attain the 50 percent required to avoid a second 
round of elections.  KFM’s signal was blocked and 
The Monitor’s news website was made inaccessible 
for several days after polling day. These were 
restored only after protracted negotiations with the 
government.
Tanzania
In contrast with Kenya, ethnicity has not been a 
34
principal means of political mobilization in Tanzania, 
which has reduced the potential for election-
related violence.  Although the Tanzanian mainland 
is inhabited by more than 120 ethnic groups, none 
is demographically or politically dominant, and the 
country shares a common language, as Kiswahili 
was promoted after independence.  According to 
the Political Parties Act of 1992, parties must have 
at least 200 members from each of the country’s 
ten regions and may not seek to promote an ethnic, 
religious or sectarian agenda.
Although multiparty competition was reinstated in 
Tanzania in 1995, the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM) party has continued to dominate of the 
presidency and parliament, at least on the mainland. 
In December 2005, CCM’s presidential candidate 
won a landslide victory and the party maintained 
its large majority.  The few violent incidents in the 
pre- and post-election period were highly localized. 
On Tanzania’s Zanzibar archipelago, elections have 
been more closely contested and have sometimes 
been violent.  Political divisions on Zanzibar’s two 
largest islands, Unguja and Pemba, continue to 
be largely geographically defined according to 
alignment during the 1964 Zanzibar revolution, 
with the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) 
very successful on Pemba and the ruling CCM 
predominant on Unguja.  Tensions surrounding 
the conditions of the 1964 union of mainland 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar still exist and constitute 
one of the principal grievances of the CUF. 
In January 2001, more than 30 civilians were killed 
by security forces on the island of Pemba during 
protests following CUF’s rejection of the results of 
December’s polls and demands for a re-run.   More 
than 2,000 people fled to Kenya as refugees. 
In 2005, the campaigning period was marked by 
violence between police and opposition supporters 
and irregularities observed during the elections 
in Zanzibar were greater than in the rest of the 
country.   Violent incidents continued in the post-
election period.  The results announced by the 
National Electoral Commission were generally 
accepted on the mainland, being contested by only 
one opposition MP.  However, the CUF refused to 
recognize the election of the CCM candidate as 
president and called for the poll to be re-run.
Somaliland 
Multiparty elections in the Republic of Somaliland, 
which seceded from Somalia in 1991 but has yet to 
be internationally recognized as a sovereign state, 
have always been contentious.  Somaliland has 
already experienced violence in the current pre-
election phase and violence is possible in the post-
election period as well.  The possibility of election-
related violence is increased as the elections have, 
as of September 2009, been delayed three times. 
At the same time, the further delay of the poll 
presents an important opportunity to implement 
some of the recommendations of this report and to 
plan for additional eventualities.
In 2001, Somalilanders voted on a constitution that 
both reaffirmed Somaliland’s independence and 
allowed for competitive elections.  Many expressed 
concern that this new political system would fail 
to recognize the importance of the clan in politics 
and traditional leaders were nervous that they 
would be marginalized.  Then-President Cigaal 
recognized these challenges and forcefully argued 
that “we could only be accepted as a member by 
the world community if we move to a new stage of 
nationhood… The international community does not 
recognize congregations of clans, each remaining 
separately independent.”28  Many Somalilanders 
were justifiably concerned that multi-party politics 
would threaten rather than reinforce the peace for which they had fought so hard.  
As with the 2003 and 2005 contests, the upcoming 
poll is limited to three recognized parties: the 
incumbent United Democratic Peoples’ Party 
(UDUB), the opposition Kulmiye, and the Party for 
Justice and Welfare (UCID). Although this three-
party policy is controversial among some sectors of 
Somaliland society for limiting avenues of political 
participation, it was developed amidst concerns 
that a proliferation of parties would result in high 
levels of political violence, as experienced in the 
1960s. 
The upcoming elections have been repeatedly 
delayed for numerous reasons but particularly due 
to challenges in the voter registration process.  An 
ambitious campaign to register all eligible voters, 
heavily supported by donors, has served to minimize 
the potential for double-voting, but it has also led 
to distrust in the entire voter registration process. 
Further complications have included fraudulent 
registrations, extensive equipment failure and 
delays due to efforts to change the technology to 
address shortcomings.  As it became clear that the 
voter registration process will not be completed in 
time for the September elections, President Riyale 
28  Bryden, Rebuilding Somaliland, 16. 
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further delayed the elections.  Donors have made 
strong demands that the NEC has to be reformed 
before the election occurs, and indeed many 
Somalilanders have criticized the competencies 
and biases of the NEC.  Opposition parties have 
threatened to boycott the elections unless their 
demands are met, and there is very real concern that 
the elections will be able to proceed peacefully.29 
The most recent agreement endorsed the resolution 
of the Somaliland House of Elders delaying the 
presidential election for one year, until 27 September 
2009, and extending the incumbent’s term in office 
until 29 October 2009.  This has now been delayed 
further with a date still to be determined.
Similar to Kenya, most observers predict that 
Somaliland’s poll, when it occurs, will be close. 
This is not surprising as it is the second time the 
two main competitors have met.  In 2003, a mere 
80 votes separated President Riyale from his 
challenger, Ahmed Mahamoud Silanyo, leader of the 
opposition Kulmiye Party.  As in the Kenyan case, the 
final vote count in 2003 was delayed for three days, 
during which Silanyo rallied his supporters outside 
the NEC and unilaterally declared an opposition 
victory.  Silanyo conceded defeat following intense 
mediation, and after the Supreme Court ruled in 
Riyale’s favour, stating that he did not want to take 
Somaliland into a civil war.  As Silanyo is nearly 80, 
and this is the last time he will be running, there are 
real concerns that he and his supporters will not be 
so willing to cede ground in this election.
The opposition has decried the administration’s 
use of government resources.  Critics have accused 
Radio Hargeysa, Mandeeq and Somaliland National 
Television of serving as a platform for government 
attacks on the opposition.  Throughout negotiations, 
some of the key demands made by the opposition 
have related to the introduction of a regulatory 
structure governing access for all political parties 
to national radio and television and the prevention 
of use of public money to fund governing party 
campaigns.30 
There have also been concerns that the private press 
has been exacerbating a tense situation and has 
been heavily provocative towards the government, 
using language that has at times verged on hate 
29  If the elections were to be held in 2010, there would be 
four elections to be held that year: elections are scheduled in 
2010 for the House of Representatives, the Guurti, whose four-
year extension is coming to an end; and the local council elections 
which have also been delayed for three years. 
30  Somaliland Independent Scholars Group, “Implementing the 
Mediation Committee’s Recommendations.”
speech.  For example, the editor of Haatuf, Yusuf 
Gabobe, noted that his colleagues on the paper had 
recently published cartoons that “went too far” and 
had uncomfortable similarities with some of the 
messages in Kenya.31 
One major challenge for the upcoming election is 
that the NEC is not regarded as a neutral arbiter, 
in part due to its composition: of seven members, 
five are appointed by institutions closely tied to the 
current president.  As such, it is unlikely that it can 
serve its role effectively mediating between parties. 
In addition, because it has become so politicized 
recently, the NEC is also regarded by many as lacking 
the necessary competence to run the elections.
Just as Kenya faced pre-election tensions, the 
contending forces in Somaliland have also engaged 
in physical confrontations.  The legislature’s 
repeated postponement of the presidential election 
inspired street rallies by the opposition Kulmiye 
party.  In the capital, Hargeysa, a rally at Kulmiye 
headquarters became a protest march, which was 
broken up when police fired weapons to disperse 
the crowd.  In Burco, police attempted a raid of 
Kulmiye’s local headquarters, firing live ammunition 
into the building.  The operation was unsuccessful, 
however, and police retreated in the face of an 
angry local population. 
Some see these moves by the government 
as deliberate provocations, aimed at inciting 
the opposition to violence in order to justify 
further crack-downs or even another election 
postponement.  
Sudan 
Sudan is struggling with political, ethnic, religious 
and resource conflicts, with an estimated two 
million people killed since the outbreak of the 
Second Sudanese Civil War in 1983. Today, the 
government in Khartoum is dominated by President 
Omar Hasan Ahmad Al-Bashir.  Despite his recent 
indictment by the International Criminal Court for 
war crimes, Al-Bashir will again stand for president 
in the upcoming elections, scheduled for 5 April to 
12 April 2010. 
On paper, these elections, should they occur, will 
decide who controls Sudan’s powerful presidency, 
as well as the 360-member National Assembly. 
But such is the dominance of Al-Bashir’s National 
Congress Party (NCP) that most observers see little 
31  Interview: Yusuf Gabobe
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chance of opposition parties gaining power through 
elections alone.
The most recent presidential elections, held in 
2000, saw Al-Bashir claim 86.5 percent of the vote. 
In parliamentary elections held the same year, the 
NCP took 355 out of 360 seats.
In the upcoming elections, Al-Bashir faces Salva 
Kiir Mayardit, leader of the opposition Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), a 
longstanding rebel group representing the south 
of the country.  Between 1983 and 2005 the SPLM 
and its army fought for independence from the 
Khartoum government in the mostly Arab and 
Muslim north.
That war ended with the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) of 9 January 2005, which 
established a power-sharing system by which two 
Co-Vice Presidents, one drawn from the north and 
one from the south, serve alongside the president. 
The CPA also divided oil deposits between the 
regions and granted Southern Sudan autonomy 
for six years, to be followed by a referendum on 
independence.  The Southern Sudan independence 
referendum is scheduled for March 2011, an 
event likely to be of greater significance than the 
governmental elections.
Also pending is the Darfurian Amalgamation 
Referendum, due to take place in July 2010 under 
terms of the Darfur Peace Agreement, just three 
months after the presidential elections. Inhabitants 
of the three Darfur states, West Darfur, North 
Darfur and South Darfur, will decide whether to 
merge them into one Autonomous Region of Darfur 
with its own constitution and government.
37
Appendix B: List of Workshop Participants
Allen, Tim – Professor in Development Anthropology at the London School of Economics
Aregawi, Amare – Manager and Editor-in-Chief of the Reporter newspaper in Ethiopia 
Blackmore, Henrietta – Project Officer at the British Embassy in Ethiopia
Deane, James – Head of Policy Development at the BBC World Service Trust
Fadal, Mohamed Osman – Director of the Social Research and Development Institute in Hargeysa, 
Somaliland
Gagliardone, Iginio – PhD researcher at London School of Economics and senior researcher at the Stanhope 
Centre
Goretti Linda, Nassanga – Senior lecturer at the Mass Communication Department, Makerere University
Helling, Dominik – PhD researcher at the London School of Economics and senior researcher at the 
Stanhope Centre 
Kameir, ElWathig Mohamed – Former lecturer at the University of Khartoum
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Klement, Alice – Fulbright scholar teaching in the Department of Journalism at Addis Ababa University, 
Ethiopia
Levy, David – Director of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford
Mancini, Paolo – Professor at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Perugia
Manyozo, Linje – Lecturer in the Media and Communications Department at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science
Marsh, John – Interim assistant director of the Carter Center’s projects in Ghana and Ethiopia 
Mesfin, Berouk – Senior researcher at the Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
Moehler, Devra – Professor at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania
Mukholi, David – Editor of the Sunday Vision, Kampala, Uganda
Mulugeta, Samson –Ethiopian journalist and foreign correspondent based in Johannesburg, South Africa
Nakkazi, Esther – Freelance reporter and regular contributor to the East African, Kampala, Uganda. 
Njogu, Kimani – Director of Twaweza Communications, Nairobi, Kenya
Nyutho, Edwin Ngure – Lecturer at the School of Journalism at the University of Nairobi, Kenya
Price, Monroe – Professor and Director of the Center of Global Communication Studies (CGCS) at the 
Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania 
Rodny-Gumede, Ylva – Senior researcher at the Stanhope Centre, Lecturer at the University of 
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Stremlau, Nicole – Coordinator and Research Fellow, Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy, 
Centre of Socio-legal Studies, University of Oxford
Tabaire, Bernard – Co-managing editor of the Daily Monitor, Uganda
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Temesgen, Derbew – Lawyer, Ethiopia
Yusuf, Magid – Lawyer and Secretary General of the Sudanese National Constitutional Review Commission 
on secondment from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sudan
Unable to attend:
El Baz, Adil – Editor in Chief and owner of Al Ahdath; Chairman of the Eastern African Professional Journalist 
Association, Sudan
Gabobe, Yusuf Abdi – Editor, Haatuf and Somaliland Times, Somaliland
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